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RETHINKING MUNICIPAL CORPORATE 
RIGHTS 
HANNAH J. WISEMAN* 
Abstract: In two seemingly antithetical trends, U.S. law increasingly recognizes 
corporate rights while denying similar rights in the municipal context. Although 
other corporate forms have celebrated major victories in the First Amendment 
context, courts have suggested that municipalities lack any constitutional rights, 
and states increasingly preempt local governments’ abilities to address pressing 
societal concerns. Yet U.S. municipalities are, and have long been, corporations. 
The erosion of municipal power is problematic because cities’ importance is 
growing. 
Many accounts have bemoaned the lack of municipal rights in the context of 
weak local home rule authority, but this Article takes a different approach. It ar-
gues that there are many municipal rights in existing law, particularly if one ex-
tends the functionalist theory of the corporation to encompass municipal corpora-
tions. The legal justifications for corporate rights, such as contributing to the 
marketplace of ideas, vindicating individual preferences, and amplifying individ-
ual voices of their members, are often more applicable to the municipal corpora-
tion than other forms of corporations, yet many of these rights have not been ex-
tended to the municipal context. 
This Article accordingly calls for enhanced attention to municipal corporate 
rights in the context of federalism and constitutional rights. The Article does not 
argue that municipal corporate rights should consistently trump legitimate state 
reasons for local preemption or that municipalities should be afforded all federal 
constitutional rights. Instead it argues that in preemption questions and constitu-
tional rights cases, two functional considerations should play a central role in 
courts’ analyses. First, courts should ask whether protecting the municipality 
against state preemption, or granting it protection under a federal constitutional 
right, would achieve the core purposes of intrastate federalism or the constitu-
tional right. Second, courts should ask how these favorable outcomes for a mu-
nicipality would help or harm the municipality’s role, both as a government and a 
corporate provider of a city brand and services. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The right of natural persons to form associations is firmly embedded 
within U.S. governance, and associations have become immensely powerful 
and important entities.1 They enable meaningful self-governance of groups 
with similar needs or goals, allow for coordinated investments in capital and 
services,2 and can amplify individual beliefs within national and international 
debates.3 For example, when banks refused to loan money to assault weapons 
manufacturers following a gruesome high school shooting in Florida, several 
members of Congress took note.4 And after corporations pulled billions of dol-
lars of investments out of North Carolina due to the state’s transgender re-
strictions, other Republican governors refused to follow suit.5 
There is a growing movement in U.S. law to more formally recognize the 
role of associations in modern life by giving them a stronger, more broadly 
defined legal status, and to give them rights of their own. The number and type 
of associations has grown—states now approve or even compel the formation 
of thousands of homeowners’ associations that closely govern residential 
communities.6 Different types of corporations and partnerships now abound, 
                                                                                                                           
 1 See, e.g., Margaret M. Blair & Elizabeth Pollman, The Derivative Nature of Corporate Consti-
tutional Rights, 56 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1673, 1682 (2015) (noting that “from its earliest case con-
sidering the treatment of corporations under the Constitution, the [U.S. Supreme] Court saw the cor-
poration as representing the identifiable group of people who had chosen to associate through the 
corporate form”). 
 2 See Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The Essential Role of Organizational Law, 110 
YALE L.J. 387, 392–93 (2000) (describing the function of an organization in pooling assets). 
 3 See, e.g., Creek v. Vill. of Westhaven, 80 F.3d 186, 193 (7th Cir. 1996) (“To the extent, more-
over, that a municipality is the voice of its residents—is, indeed, a megaphone amplifying voices that 
might not otherwise be audible—a curtailment of its right to speak might be thought a curtailment of 
the unquestioned First Amendment rights of those residents.”). 
 4 See Alan Rappeport, Banks Tried to Curb Gun Sales. Now Republicans Are Trying to Stop 
Them., N.Y. TIMES (May 25, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/25/us/politics/banks-gun-
sales-republicans.html [https://perma.cc/JMH9-9K8R] (noting banks’ restrictions on financing of gun 
sales and Republican lawmakers’ threats to halt this practice of “social activism”). 
 5 See, e.g., Greg Botelho & Wayne Drash, South Dakota Governor Vetoes Transgender Bath-
room Bill, CNN (Mar. 2, 2016), https://www.cnn.com/2016/03/01/us/south-dakota-transgender-
bathroom-bill/index.html [https://perma.cc/VGE9-KHEP] (reporting that South Dakota’s Republican 
governor vetoed a similar transgender restrictions bill in the immediate wake of the North Carolina 
backlash); Camila Domonoske, AP Calculates North Carolina’s ‘Bathroom Bill’ Will Cost More Than 
$3.7 Billion,  (Mar. 27, 2017), https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2017/03/27/521676772/ap-
calculates-north-carolinas-bathroom-bill-will-cost-more-than-3-7-billion [https://perma.cc/YPD4-
K6S2] (describing the estimated economic losses resulting from retaliation from businesses and sports 
organizations). 
 6 See Paula A. Franzese & Steven Siegel, Trust and Community: The Common Interest Commu-
nity as Metaphor and Paradox, 72 MO. L. REV. 1111, 1120–22 (2007) (describing requirements for 
the formation of homeowners’ associations). Many states also allow for the formation of “public bene-
fit” and “social purpose” corporations, which may (or are required to) have a social component of 
their business, including, for example, considering impacts on employees, the community, and the 
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and a growing set of court opinions such as Citizens United v. Federal Election 
Commission7 and Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores8 grants constitutional and 
statutory rights to certain types of associations while emphasizing through dic-
ta that these rights should extend more broadly. The associations at the heart of 
this Article are corporations, and the Article therefore refers specifically to 
“corporate rights.”9 
The movement toward corporate rights is by no means a universal good.10 
Indeed, this Article discusses the many flaws that pervade corporate rights doc-
trine. But current doctrine and the scholarly debate surrounding corporate 
rights largely exclude one of the most important forms of corporation—the 
incorporated local government, or “municipality.”11 Municipalities embody 
                                                                                                                           
environment when they make business decisions. See, e.g., Michael B. Dorff, Why Public Benefit 
Corporations?, 42 DEL. J. CORP. L. 77, 80, 84 (2017) (noting that in 2013, Delaware joined thirteen 
other states in allowing the creation of public benefit corporations, and that thirty-five states and the 
District of Columbia now have public benefit corporations statutes). 
 7 See Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 372 (2010) (reversing a district 
court’s determination that federal restrictions on corporate-funded electioneering communications 
were constitutional). 
 8 See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682, 689–90, 736 (2014) (concluding that 
federal laws requiring closely-held corporations to provide health insurance coverage for contracep-
tives that violated company owners’ “sincerely held religious beliefs” violated the Religious Freedom 
Restoration Act). 
 9 See ADAM WINKLER, WE THE CORPORATIONS: HOW AMERICAN BUSINESSES WON THEIR 
CIVIL RIGHTS, at xvi (2018) (discussing the roots of corporate rights). There are both incorporated and 
unincorporated communities, but “incorporation” is an express choice by citizens to form an official 
local government that will exercise certain powers over citizens and provide certain public services. 
See, e.g., Richard Briffault, Our Localism: Part I—The Structure of Local Government Law, 90 COL-
UM. L. REV. 1, 73–74 (1990) (noting that “[i]n most states, general enabling legislation places munici-
pal incorporation in the hands of local residents or landowners” and that municipal corporations wield 
police powers, provide public services, and “impose general taxes”). 
 10 See, e.g., Blair & Pollman, supra note 1, at 1731–35 (observing that the Supreme Court, in 
expanding certain rights to corporations, has consistently relied on derivative liability—the idea that 
the corporation protects the rights of the natural persons who are its members—while failing to recog-
nize that many of the various types of corporations do not actually represent a natural person, member, 
or group of members). 
 11 See, e.g., MARK G. YUDOF, WHEN GOVERNMENT SPEAKS: POLITICS, LAW, AND GOVERN-
MENT EXPRESSION IN AMERICA 44 (1983) (“The beguiling symmetry inherent in the notion of treating 
municipal corporations and states (not to speak of the federal government) as the constitutional equiv-
alents of private corporations has been rejected, albeit ambiguously, by the Supreme Court.” (citing 
Williams v. Mayor, 289 U.S. 36 (1933))); Yishai Blank, City Speech, 54 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 
365, 368 (2019) (noting that “according to a dominant doctrine, cities have to obtain permission from 
their states to engage in expressive (and other) activities” and are increasingly prohibited from doing 
so); Richard C. Schragger, Essay, When White Supremacists Invade a City, 104 VA. L. REV. ONLINE 
58, 67 (2018), https://www.virginialawreview.org/sites/virginialawreview.org/files/Schragger_Online.
pdf [https://perma.cc/6ZAX-UHEN] (noting that although cities, individuals, and corporate bodies are 
all subject to state power, “[u]nlike individuals and corporations, the city does not generally enjoy 
countervailing property or constitutional rights”). As used here, the term “municipality” refers to a 
municipal corporation. Municipal corporations have two key attributes: they are incorporated, mean-
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most, if not all, of the values championed by the corporate rights movement. 
With respect to furthering the purposes of rights, such as First Amendment 
rights, municipalities enhance the power of their individual members’ voices,12 
provide meaningful representation of members’ views—beyond the formal 
representation that municipalities provide as governments,13 and contribute a 
valuable perspective to the marketplace of ideas.14 In many ways, municipali-
ties better match these types of values than do the corporations that have bene-
fited from this movement, such as for-profit corporations. 
Increasingly, municipalities do not just act as governments representing the 
views of their voting members. Like for-profit and nonprofit corporations, mu-
nicipalities also project policy positions onto a larger stage by adopting a particu-
lar brand to influence the national debate and, sometimes, to attract certain types 
of residents or businesses.15 Municipalities have promoted individual rights 
                                                                                                                           
ing the state has approved a charter or other document that gives them a separate, independent exist-
ence as an association, and they are “public” in that they “exist for public political purposes,” includ-
ing administering “local civil government.” CHARLES S. RHYNE, THE LAW OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT 
OPERATIONS 2 (1980). A simpler definition that combines and elaborates on these characteristics 
defines the municipal corporation as “a city, town or village governed by elected officers, having the 
power to tax, and possessing characteristics of local self-government in that it is without obligations to 
report its activities directly to the state government.” Id. at 3. This Article sometimes uses the term 
“city” as shorthand for a municipal corporation; city, as used here, is meant to encompass municipal 
corporations of all sizes, including towns, villages, and boroughs (where boroughs are incorporated 
local governments, as opposed to mere subdivisions of a city). Id. at 5. 
 12 Vill. of Westhaven, 80 F.3d at 193. 
 13 This Article argues that all forms of corporations, including municipalities, increasingly repre-
sent at least a subset of their members’ and consumers’ views by taking national and international 
political stances—by, for example, boycotting states by pulling conferences and other planned events 
out of those states, signing high-profile letters objecting to certain policies, widely circulating these 
stances through social media, and collectively committing to social goals, such as reducing carbon 
emissions. See, e.g., Andrew Ross Sorkin, ‘Simply Unacceptable’: Executives Demand Senate Action 
on Gun Violence, N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK (Sept. 12, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/09/12/
business/dealbook/gun-background-checks-business.html [https://perma.cc/V7QA-GBE8] (describing 
a letter from almost 150 CEOs demanding action on gun reform); Who’s in, WE ARE STILL IN, https://
www.wearestillin.com/signatories [https://perma.cc/928N-3PE3] (showing 2,856 businesses, cities, 
states, Native American tribes, and other entities that have agreed to meet the Paris Climate Agree-
ment targets); see also infra notes 242–243 and accompanying text.  
 14 See Blank, supra note 11, at 368 (arguing for a distinct speech right for cities because cities, 
collectively, represent a far more diverse range of cultural, ethnic, religious, economic, and other 
interests than do other levels of government; are at the front lines of a variety of pressing issues for 
which debate is important, including for example, social and economic issues; and are “small, nimble, 
and responsive” and thus able to “stir democratic civic engagement,” among other reasons); Paul 
Diller, Intrastate Preemption, 87 B.U. L. REV. 1113, 1117–19 (2007) (pointing to cities as a key con-
tributor to innovative ideas). For a detailed description of cities’ many directly expressive activities, 
see, e.g., Blank, supra note 11, at 367–68 (providing examples of local lobbying of state and federal 
representatives, support of or opposition to state referenda, placement of banners on city halls, and 
removing monuments, among other activities). 
 15 For-profit corporations also project policy stances onto a national stage. Like cities attracting 
residents and businesses, they appear to do this in part to attract certain types of employees. See, e.g., 
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movements by enacting powerful anti-discrimination laws16 and allowing gay 
marriage, before state laws or the Supreme Court of the United States recognized 
these rights.17 Some of the largest U.S. cities have minimum wage laws far more 
generous than the national minimum,18 and more than 160 local governments, 
ranging from tiny towns to New York City, have elected sanctuary city status, in 
which they refuse to assist the government in arresting, detaining, and deporting 
immigrants.19 And 229 municipalities, along with other types of corporations, 
and some states and tribes, have committed to implement the targets of the inter-
national climate agreement from which President Trump withdrew.20 Indeed, 
when more than half of the states sued to challenge the validity of the federal 
Clean Power Plan limiting carbon emissions, several large cities within those 
states took the opposite position, intervening to defend the Plan.21 
Although the most high-profile municipal efforts have tended to fall on 
the progressive side of the spectrum, some municipalities, speaking for resi-
dents with different political preferences, have pledged to assist the federal 
                                                                                                                           
CLAY RISEN, THE BILL OF THE CENTURY: THE EPIC BATTLE FOR THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT 247 (2014) 
(noting that by the 1960s, many businesses readily complied with the Civil Rights Act, “particularly in 
the larger cities,” because “attracting non-Southern investment and workers had become a key part of 
civic economic strategies”); Open Letter from Undersigned Business Leaders to Patrick McCrory, 
Governor of North Carolina (undated), http://assets2.hrc.org/files/assets/resources/NC_CEO_Letter_
(3).pdf [https://perma.cc/HN23-EA78] (criticizing the state’s “bathroom bill,” arguing that the bill 
“will make it far more challenging for businesses across the state to recruit and retain the nation’s best 
and brightest workers and attract the most talented students from across the country”). 
 16 See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 623–24 (1996) (describing the various anti-discrimination 
laws passed by Colorado municipalities to protect sexual orientation, which led to an amendment of 
the Colorado Constitution). 
 17 See DANIEL R. PINELLO, AMERICA’S STRUGGLE FOR SAME-SEX MARRIAGE 1–4 (2006) (de-
scribing how the Republican clerk of Sandoval County, New Mexico, decided to issue marriage li-
censes to same-sex couples in February 2004, but was shut down a day later due to resistance from the 
Republican Party and county commissioners); id. at 19 (describing how in San Francisco, under or-
ders from the mayor, officials began issuing marriage licenses to same-sex couples—an action later 
halted by the California Supreme Court); id. (noting similar actions by mayors, clerks, and other offi-
cials in New Paltz, New York, Portland, Oregon, and Asbury Park, New Jersey). 
 18 RICHARD SCHRAGGER, CITY POWER: URBAN GOVERNANCE IN A GLOBAL AGE 3 (2016) 
[hereinafter SCHRAGGER, CITY POWER]. But see Richard Schragger, The Attack on American Cities, 
96 TEX. L. REV. 1163, 1174–75 (2018) [hereinafter Schragger, Attack on American Cities] (noting 
that many states have preempted local minimum wage laws). 
 19 Bryan Griffith & Jessica M. Vaughan, Maps: Sanctuary Cities, Counties, and States, CTR. FOR 
IMMIGR. STUD. (Apr. 16, 2019), https://cis.org/Map-Sanctuary-Cities-Counties-and-States [https://
perma.cc/A392-XWZW]. 
 20 See WE ARE STILL IN, supra note 13 (illustrating almost 3,000 businesses, cities, states, Native 
American tribes, and other entities that have committed to meet the Paris Climate Agreement goals). 
 21 See List of Supporters of the Clean Power Plan in Court, ENVTL. DEF. FUND, https://www.edf.
org/sites/default/files/content/list_of_supporters_of_the_clean_power_plan_in_court.pdf [https://
perma.cc/T433-3FV6] (showing Houston and several Florida cities defending the Clean Power Plan). 
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government in immigrant deportation efforts22 and have proposed “sanctuary 
cities” for gun rights.23 Further, as both corporate actors and governments, mu-
nicipalities offer an increasingly diverse array of services, infrastructure, and 
policies. Municipalities compete with other corporations to provide essential 
human services, such as education, sewer, drinking water, and electricity, often 
providing these services to residents who would have few other options for 
obtaining them.24 Municipalities collectively spend only 16% less on public 
services than do all of the states, combined.25 Further, large municipalities 
serve as hosts to the most significant economic growth in the United States, 
outcompeting many countries—and the majority of states—with respect to 
economic output.26 
Municipalities have many of the statutory and constitutional rights needed 
to successfully continue their political and economic roles, as explored in this 
Article. But they have also been largely marginalized from the movement for 
enhanced corporate rights, and their authority to act is shrinking in important 
                                                                                                                           
 22 See Jennifer McEntee, San Diego County Backs Trump Challenge to California ‘Sanctuary’ 
Law, REUTERS (Apr. 17, 2018), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-immigration-california/san-
diego-county-backs-trump-challenge-to-california-sanctuary-law-idUSKBN1HO2XE [https://perma.
cc/62VV-U7SN] (reporting on the San Diego Board of Advisor’s vote to direct the county attorney to 
submit a friend of the court brief supporting President Trump’s deportation policies). 
 23 See Erik Lacitis, Tiny City of Republic Delays Vote on Police Chief’s Gun Sanctuary Pro-
posal, SEATTLE TIMES (Nov. 20, 2018), https://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/politics/tiny-town-
of-republic-delays-vote-on-police-chiefs-gun-sanctuary-proposal/ [https://perma.cc/496J-4V46] (not-
ing a town’s proposal to refuse to enforce a state gun control law); see also Richard Briffault, Essay, 
The Challenge of the New Preemption, 70 STAN. L. REV. 1995, 1997–98 (2018) (noting that the ma-
jority of examples of state preemption of local law have involved conservative state governments 
preempting local progressive behavior). 
 24 See, e.g., Andrea Kopaskie, Public vs. Private: A National Overview of Water Systems, UNC 
SCH. GOV’T ENVTL. FIN. CTR. (Oct. 19, 2016), http://efc.web.unc.edu/2016/10/19/public-vs-private-a-
national-overview-of-water-systems/ [https://perma.cc/T68R-XAKW] (finding that public water sys-
tems serve a majority of the residents in fifty out of fifty-two states and territories). 
 25 See JEFFREY L. BARNETT ET AL., U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 2012 CENSUS OF GOVERNMENTS: 
FINANCE—STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT SUMMARY REPORT 8 (2014), https://www.census.gov/
content/dam/Census/library/publications/2014/econ/summary-report.pdf [https://perma.cc/V2RH-
ZWM7] (observing that in 2012, state governments spent a total of $1.98 billion on all public services, 
and local governments spent $1.66 billion). Several decades ago, local governments spent even more 
than state and federal governments. See ADVISORY COMM’N ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS 
(ACIR), STATE AND LOCAL ROLES IN THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 6 (Apr. 1982), http://hdl.handle.net/
2027/msu.31293016095329 [https://perma.cc/JT69-K8WJ] (“In FY 1977, 43% of all direct expendi-
tures for domestic governmental purposes was made by local governments. The states accounted for 
27% and the federal government for 30% of the total . . . .”). 
 26 See SCHRAGGER, CITY POWER, supra note 18, at 28–29 (noting municipalities’ outsized con-
tributions to the U.S. economy); Chris Tausanovitch & Christopher Warshaw, Representation in Mu-
nicipal Government, 108 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 605, 605 (2014) (noting that local governments “collect 
nearly a quarter of the nation’s revenues”). 
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respects.27 States now regularly preempt city actions on issues ranging from 
climate change to gun control, plastic bag bans, regulation of hydraulic fractur-
ing for oil and gas, and immigration.28 In some cases, states substantially pe-
nalize cities and their officials for attempting to regulate in preempted areas. 
For example, Florida allows the governor to remove from office and fine local 
officials who enact gun control laws, and the state prohibits cities from funding 
these officials’ defense, among other measures.29 
Municipal corporate rights should not serve as an absolute or even con-
sistent shield against preemption; there are many doctrinal, theoretical, and 
practical reasons for intrastate preemption.30 But municipalities’ important sta-
tus as corporations that provide essential public services—particularly to peo-
ple who otherwise would struggle to obtain those services—and project their 
citizens’ views on an increasingly national and international platform needs ex-
plicit recognition. This dual status should factor prominently in the balancing 
tests that courts often deploy when deciding intrastate preemption questions.31 
Beyond state preemption, in the context of federal constitutional rights, 
the Supreme Court has gone so far as to declare that a “private corporation en-
joys constitutional protections, but a political subdivision, ‘created by the state 
. . . has no privileges or immunities under the federal constitution which it may 
invoke in opposition to the will of its creator.’”32 In an older case, Trustees of 
Dartmouth College v. Woodward, the Court similarly stated in dicta that alt-
hough revocation of private corporations’ charters could run afoul of the Con-
tract Clause, for municipal corporations, the “legislature of the State may act 
according to its own judgment, unrestrained by any limitation of its power im-
                                                                                                                           
 27 See WINKLER, supra note 9, at 389–94 (discussing a 2014 case in which corporate constitu-
tional rights were pitted directly against municipal rights, and the corporation won); supra note 11 and 
accompanying text. 
 28 See, e.g., Lori Riverstone-Newell, The Rise of State Preemption Laws in Response to Local 
Policy Innovation, 47 PUBLIUS 403, 407 (2017) (describing the expansive scope of preemption laws 
and providing examples of the subject areas preempted). 
 29 See id. at 405 (explaining how this more aggressive approach to preemption is described as 
“maximum preemption” by political scientists). Legal scholars such as Richard Briffault define this 
approach as “new” and “punitive” preemption. States wholly block local governments from regulating 
in a particular area rather than simply providing a floor—above which local governments could regu-
late more stringently—or a ceiling—below which local governments could write less stringent rules. 
Further, these states do not take up governance of the preempted area at the state level, and in some 
cases, they provide direct punishment for officials and governments who attempt to disobey by prom-
ulgating or enforcing local laws in the preempted area. See Briffault, supra note 23, at 1999–2008 
(defining and describing these new preemption categories). 
 30 See discussion infra Part IV.B. 
 31 See discussion infra Part IV.B. 
 32 Ysursa v. Pocatello Educ. Ass’n, 555 U.S. 353, 363 (2009) (internal citation omitted) (quoting 
Williams v. Mayor of Baltimore, 289 U.S. 36 (1933)). 
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posed by the constitution of the United States.”33 Indeed, courts have been so 
staunch in their separation of the municipal corporation from business corpora-
tions that when a municipality purchases an enterprise previously operated by 
a business corporation and continues operating that enterprise, the protections 
that were previously afforded to that enterprise vis-à-vis the state immediately 
disappear.34 
As with preemption, municipal corporate status should not mean that lo-
cal governments should have all rights enjoyed by traditional corporations, or 
that local governments should be deemed to universally possess particular First 
Amendment or other constitutional rights. This, too, should be contextual—
just as the application of constitutional rights to traditional for-profit corpora-
tions has been. 
In summary, it is time to recognize the municipal corporation as a legal 
association—one worthy of the types of rights afforded to the diverse corpora-
tions that have recently received enhanced scholarly, statutory, and judicial 
attention. This recognition should apply in the context of intrastate preemption 
and constitutional rights, not as a definitive affirmance of municipal power, but 
as a meaningful factor that influences a court’s analysis. Corporations have 
important differences. This is particularly true of the municipal corporation, 
which is both a public governing entity and a more traditional service- and 
goods-providing corporation.35 Yet these differences do not justify the treat-
ment of municipal corporations as entities devoid of any rights. 
To argue that some corporate rights should extend to municipal activity, 
this Article combines a functional, or instrumentalist, approach to corporate 
rights36 with an institutional approach.37 Functionally, the Article argues that 
                                                                                                                           
 33 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1 (Contract Clause); Trs. of Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17 
U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518, 628, 630 (1819). 
 34 See Trenton v. New Jersey, 262 U.S. 182, 184–85 (1923) (finding that “[t]he relations existing 
between the state and the water company were not the same as those between the state and the city[; t]he 
company was organized and carried on its business for pecuniary profit[, and i]ts rights and property 
were privately owned and therefore safeguarded by . . . constitutional provisions” such as the Contract 
Clause). Municipalities, however, received no such protections according to the Court. Id. 
 35 See, e.g., RHYNE, supra note 11, at 2–3 (describing the “public” municipal corporations as 
distinct from private corporations in that they “exist for public political purposes,” and are “estab-
lished primarily to regulate the local or internal affairs of the area incorporated, and secondarily to 
share in the civil government of the state in the particular locality” (quoting Dartmouth Coll., 17 U.S. 
(4 Wheat.) at 699)); Schragger, supra note 11, at 67 (noting the dominance of the public-private dis-
tinction in corporate law, which treats “public” municipal corporations differently because these cor-
porations are governments (essentially, subdivisions of states), and thus not viewed as having rights to 
be asserted against states). 
 36 See Blair & Pollman, supra note 1, at 1735–38 (arguing for a dual derivate and instrumentalist 
approach to corporate rights, in which a corporation would have derivative rights of its members only 
if it could identify the member or group of members with that right, and the purpose of those members 
in forming the corporation related to that right, and an instrumentalist approach in which a corporation 
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municipal corporate rights are valuable if granting rights to the municipality 
would further the purpose of the right. Institutionally, these rights have even 
more merit if attaching them to municipal corporate action would further the 
legitimate corporate purposes of the municipality. These include creating and 
maintaining a particular brand to attract residents and businesses and providing 
important services and goods to resident “members” of the municipal corpora-
tion.38 In the preemption context, courts should similarly ask whether preempt-
ing the local government would achieve the purposes of preemption, such as 
avoiding a “race to the bottom” in regulation, avoiding conflicting laws that 
impede business activity in the state, or ensuring regulation of externalities at 
the geographic scale on which those externalities fall.39 Courts should also ask 
                                                                                                                           
received a right if it would further the purpose of the right); Elizabeth Pollman, Reconceiving Corpo-
rate Personhood, 2011 UTAH L. REV. 1629, 1671 (arguing that courts should “accord constitutional 
protections to corporations when it promotes the objectives of those protections”). 
 37 See, e.g., David Fagundes, State Actors as First Amendment Speakers, 100 NW. U. L. REV. 
1637, 1667 (2006) (explaining that the institutional rights theory looks to “the purpose and character 
of an institution to determine if it makes sense to extend to that institution a given right”); Roderick 
M. Hills, Jr., The Constitutional Rights of Private Governments, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 144, 146–48 
(2003) (describing how the institutionalist theory justifies corporate rights through the institutions’ 
ability to perform “social functions”). 
 38 In emphasizing the “corporate” purposes of a municipality, this Article does not attempt to 
revive the old test in which courts ascertained municipal liability and rights based on whether the 
municipality was acting in its private or public capacity. See, e.g., Roderick M. Hills, Jr., Romancing 
the Town: Why We (Still) Need a Democratic Defense of City Power, 113 HARV. L. REV. 2009, 2019 
(2000) (book review) (describing this public-private distinction); see also infra notes 213–214 (de-
scribing some of the cases that used this test). Rather, the Article emphasizes that beyond focusing on 
municipal home rule powers, courts should also acknowledge the many corporate purposes and func-
tions of municipalities, many of which blend with their governmental purposes and functions. Indeed, 
there is a legitimate argument that all corporations have blended public and private functions. Even 
beyond the theoretical argument that corporations owe duties to the public, corporations are increas-
ingly involved in the public policy sphere, arguing for particular laws, such as gun control and 
transgender rights, that do not relate directly to their businesses. See, e.g., David Gelles & David 
Yaffe-Bellany, Shareholder Value Is No Longer Everything, Top C.E.O.s Say, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 19, 
2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/19/business/business-roundtable-ceos-corporations.html 
[https://perma.cc/3FCR-AEVA] (describing a letter from nearly 200 prominent CEOs arguing that 
corporations owe duties to the public on prominent national policy issues). In some cases, these corpora-
tions adopt controversial positions that might not represent the views of the majority of their shareholders 
or customers, just as municipalities speaking out in national policy debates do not necessarily channel the 
majority view of their residents and businesses. See, e.g., Manish Dudharejia, 4 Branding Lessons from 
Nike’s Colin Kaepernick Ad, ENTREPRENEUR (Oct. 22, 2018), https://www.entrepreneur.com/article/
321130 [https://perma.cc/U68L-GK2J] (noting that when Nike supported Colin Kaepernick, this was 
largely on the advice of a marketing director, and it was a risky move because the company had a 
contract with the NFL, which opposed Kaepernick’s kneeling during the national anthem). 
 39 These are the types of legitimate reasons for state preemption of local control that Richard 
Briffault and Richard Schragger have noted, as well as preventing local majorities from silencing 
important minority interests. See Briffault, supra note 23, at 2025 (noting “extralocal consequences of 
local actions; the burdens that can result from multiple and divergent local rules; and the scale at 
which economic, social, environmental, and other problems are handled”); Schragger, supra note 11, 
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whether preemption would limit the important municipal corporate objectives 
noted above, in addition to home rule powers.40 
Take the example of a recent Texas preemptive statute that prohibited lo-
cal governments from refusing to cooperate with federal immigration officials 
(such as by refusing to inquire about individuals’ immigration status).41 The 
statute also required local governments to help detain potentially illegal immi-
grants, and prohibited local officials from endorsing limits on immigration en-
forcement.42 This was, in other words, a bill preempting local sanctuary city 
status—and one that is similar to bills enacted in many other states.43 From the 
functionalist approach suggested here, a court reviewing this law should first 
ask whether recognizing municipal constitutional rights in this context would 
further the purposes of this right. For instance, if the First Amendment is de-
signed to give speakers the right to speak, to give listeners the right to hear a 
variety of perspectives, and to enhance political debate, then prohibiting the 
endorsement of sanctuary city policies likely cuts against all of these purpos-
es.44 It limits cities’ ability to speak, constrains the range of views on immigra-
                                                                                                                           
at 65 (“The usual rationales for centralized regulation in any given case are the presence of externali-
ties, the need for uniformity, and a concern about pathologies in the local political process that result 
in majoritarian oppression.”). For an extensive discussion of the risks and challenges of decentralized 
control (such as state rather than federal control, or local rather than state control), see, e.g., David B. 
Spence, Federalism, Regulatory Lags, and the Political Economy of Energy Production, 161 U. PA. L. 
REV. 431, 462–65 (2013) (summarizing the four typical arguments in favor of preemption); Richard 
B. Stewart, Pyramids of Sacrifice? Problems of Federalism in Mandating State Implementation of 
National Environmental Policy, 86 YALE L.J. 1196, 1211–12 (1977) (describing the “race to the bot-
tom,” in which decentralized entities compete to loosen regulatory standards to attract business). 
 40 Home rule powers, although not determinative in many preemption cases, sometimes still 
sway courts to interpret potentially vague preemption in favor of the local government. For example, 
in Wallach v. Town of Dryden, the highest New York court found that express legislation that ap-
peared to preempt local regulation of oil and gas did not preempt local land regulation of that devel-
opment, noting that it does not “lightly” preempt home rule authority. 16 N.E.3d 1188, 1192, 1195–98 
(N.Y. 2014). In other cases, home rule powers are determinative due to the wording of state constitu-
tions. For example, in Colorado, if a local government acts within its home rule authority and address-
es a matter of purely local concern, it may override conflicting state law. See City of Longmont v. 
Colo. Oil & Gas Ass’n, 369 P.3d 573, 579 (Colo. 2016). 
 41 See TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 752.053 (West 2017). 
 42 See City of El Cenizo v. Texas, 890 F.3d 164, 173–76 (5th Cir. 2018) (describing TEX. GOV’T 
CODE ANN. § 752.053, which provides that “a local entity may not ‘adopt, enforce, or endorse a poli-
cy under which [it] prohibits or materially limits’ immigration enforcement”). 
 43 Pratheepan Gulasekaram et al., Anti-Sanctuary and Immigration Localism, 119 COLUM. L. 
REV. 837, 839–40 (2019) (describing Texas’s law, six other states with similar laws, and seventeen 
additional states that “have introduced or passed like-minded bills”). 
 44 For a focus on the First Amendment as fostering the dissemination of ideas for the benefit of 
the public, see Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 343 (quoting Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, 
475 U.S. 1 (1986)). The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, which invalidated only the “en-
dorsement” portion of the statute, focused narrowly on the fact that speech by “elected officials” (in 
this case local elected officials) is subject to a strict scrutiny test and expressly found that similar re-
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tion heard by the public, and similarly restricts debate on immigration issues 
by silencing one important voice in the debate. Local governments are im-
portant participants in the national immigration debate because local officials 
are often at the front lines of immigration issues. There are far more local than 
federal police, and local officials are often the first to respond to employment, 
housing, and social services issues that might ultimately trigger immigration 
enforcement questions.45 
Next, a court should ask whether granting the municipality a First 
Amendment right in this context would further the legitimate purposes of the 
municipality as a corporation. In this case, prohibiting those who represent the 
city from voicing their opinions about federal immigration policy would im-
pede all of these purposes. It would force cities to project a specific opinion on 
an issue that is central to their very brand and identity—the types of residents 
they will welcome and support—because it prohibits them from opposing fed-
eral efforts to identify individuals who might be illegal immigrants. Requiring 
cities to take a “tough-on-immigration” stance, again, might deter important 
business activity. It could, too, affect cities’ ability to provide important public 
services if they were forced to devote more resources to assisting with federal 
immigration efforts. Requiring local support for a federal “tough-on-
immigration” approach could also reduce community safety by deterring some 
individuals—particularly those fearing immigration enforcement—from re-
porting crimes.46 
This is not to say that a court should definitively extend First Amendment 
protection to the municipality, although it should (and did) extend this protec-
tion to local officials who were unlawfully prohibited from speaking in favor 
of sanctuary city status.47 But these functional considerations, considered to-
gether, should potentially lead a court to extend the right. The difficulty would, 
of course, arise in line drawing, as discussed in more detail in Part IV.48 After 
all, nearly any municipal statute, whether it is a ban on plastic bags or a sanc-
tuary city ordinance, could be viewed as “speech” projecting a particular city 
brand to potential residents and ensuring the provision of important public ser-
vices to city “members” (residents). 
Beyond the question of whether the city should possess a constitutional 
right that shields it from a particular law, courts also often face a direct 
                                                                                                                           
strictions on the employees of those officials would not violate the First Amendment. El Cenizo, 890 
F.3d at 184–85. 
 45 Gulasekaram et al., supra note 43, at 875. 
 46 See, e.g., id. at 839 (noting that a Travis County, Texas, sheriff focused on the importance of 
crime reporting in supporting sanctuary city status). 
 47 See El Cenizo, 890 F.3d at 185. 
 48 See discussion infra Part IV. 
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preemption question. In the preemption context—asking whether Texas should 
have preempted local governments from taking different stances on federal 
immigration policy—a court should ask whether preemption comported with 
the legitimate purposes of intrastate preemption and impeded core local gov-
ernment purposes. Here, again, the state might lose. If we assume, as intro-
duced above, the states legitimately preempt local control to avoid inconsistent 
regulation that impedes inter-city commerce and address externalities that flow 
beyond local borders, among other purposes, it is not clear that preemption 
should trump local government purposes in this context. Requiring consistent 
local cooperation with federal immigration enforcement efforts might chill im-
portant statewide business activity—activity that takes place within individual 
cities—if businesses feared that even legal employees who spoke a certain way 
or had a particular type of appearance might be questioned and intimidated by 
police. The issue of extra-municipal externalities is more complex. The State 
of Texas likely has an interest in addressing the many effects of immigration 
policy that extend beyond local borders. But this is more of a national than a 
state-level concern. And although regulating immigration enforcement at a 
larger scale would certainly help the federal government by forcing local offi-
cials throughout the state to assist with its efforts, the federal government 
could not have issued this requirement, as it likely would have violated the 
anticommandeering provision implicit in the Constitution.49 Indeed, some 
scholars have suggested that in this context there might be something akin to a 
local right against state commandeering.50 This is not to say that the Texas bill 
should definitively be struck down as invalid preemption. But when courts are 
interpreting preemptive language that is not entirely clear—as they often do—
focusing more closely on both the purposes of intrastate preemption and of 
local corporations might tip the balance in favor of local control. 
Municipal rights, as asserted under the Constitution or as a shield against 
preemption, are by no means a universal good, and those who argue for en-
hanced local control—as I do here—must swallow the bitter with the sweet. 
Yet given the positive role that traditional corporations can play, both for 
                                                                                                                           
 49 Bernard W. Bell, Sanctuary Cities, Government Records, and the Anti-Commandeering Doc-
trine, 69 RUTGERS U. L. REV. 1553, 1571–72 (2017) (describing how the anti-commandeering doc-
trine, implicit in the Tenth Amendment, prohibits the federal government from forcing states, or state 
officials, to enact its policies). 
 50 Gulasekaram et al., supra note 43, at 860. The fact that states may not voluntarily accede to 
federal commandeering might be an even more persuasive argument for local protection against state 
efforts, like Texas’s immigration legislation, that effectively require local officials to carry out federal 
immigration directives. See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 167, 182 (1992) (noting in an 
anti-commandeering case that “[w]here Congress exceeds its authority relative to the States, . . . the 
departure from the constitutional plan cannot be ratified by the ‘consent’ of state officials”). 
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members of the corporation and society at large, the drawbacks do not justify a 
denial of all corporate rights, as has typically occurred for municipalities. 
Part I of this Article introduces the rights of business corporations, the 
rights of municipal corporations, the critical corporate role of municipalities, 
and the rights that municipalities possess and lack in association with this 
role.51 Parts II and III address these issues in more depth, framing the munici-
pality as an essential corporate actor worthy of many of the rights recently af-
forded to business corporations.52 Specifically, Part II defines the association 
and argues that the municipal corporation seamlessly fits within this definition, 
and not just as a formalistic matter.53 Building from this definitional argument, 
Part III analyzes the role and purpose of corporations as defined by theory and 
legal doctrine and argues that municipalities better encompass many of the 
positive traits typically attributed to corporations than do many other forms of 
corporation that currently enjoy an enhanced legal status.54 In exploring corpo-
rate purpose, Part III also documents how U.S. law has tended to thwart certain 
municipal corporate rights in particular, in large part due to its treatment of 
municipalities as a governmental arm of the state devoid of any rights. Finally, 
Part IV explores how courts should contextually extend certain corporate rights 
to the municipal corporation, both in preemption and constitutional rights cas-
es.55 Given the failure of many local empowerment proposals to gain much 
traction in the policy sphere, extending aspects of existing corporate rights to 
the municipal corporation may be the most meaningful way to provide the 
tools that local governments need to fulfill their modern corporate role. It may 
also be a rational step in light of a growing body of rights and obligations that 
now attach to a diverse array of corporations. 
I. RIGHTS THAT CITIES NEED AND LACK 
The issue of whether municipal corporations should be afforded the same 
rights as other corporations, such as for-profit entities, is nearly as old as the 
U.S. municipal corporation itself. Indeed, courts addressing local subdivisions’ 
powers in the colonies struggled to determine which local governments were 
corporations and which rights they had. For example, in New York, New York 
City was the only incorporated local subdivision (a “borough”) in the early 
1800s; unincorporated towns, counties, and cities did most of the governing.56 
                                                                                                                           
 51 See discussion infra Part I. 
 52 See discussion infra Parts II & III. 
 53 See discussion infra Part II. 
 54 See discussion infra Part III. 
 55 See discussion infra Part IV. 
 56 Joan C. Williams, The Invention of the Municipal Corporation: A Case Study in Legal Change, 
34 AM. U. L. REV. 369, 396–98 (1985). 
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Under English law, unincorporated local units lacked important powers, such 
as the power to own property and to sue and be sued, without direct legislative 
action.57 Yet New York towns, counties, and cities needed these rights to fulfill 
their responsibilities as powerful governments, and courts struggled to find 
ways to give them these rights without departing from English law.58 In Mas-
sachusetts, courts addressed this issue differently. Massachusetts laws gave 
unincorporated governments specific powers, and eventually, the courts simply 
developed a new description to cover governments that lacked a corporate 
charter yet possessed powers, calling them “quasi” or “municipal” corpora-
tions.59 Many modern local governments are now chartered, but the term stuck; 
chartered, incorporated local governments are commonly described as munici-
pal corporations.60 
Scholarly accounts, too, have long debated the nature, extent, and advisa-
bility of municipal rights, but often not through a corporate lens. Within the 
political science and legal literatures, there have long been calls to change the 
current legal structure to give local governments more power.61 Many scholars 
and policymakers have focused on expanding or reinterpreting cities’ home 
rule authority, which arises from state constitutions and statutes, and gives lo-
cal governments some self-governing powers that are not as easily removed by 
the state.62 But the limits of home rule authority have been widely noted63 and 
                                                                                                                           
 57 Id. at 401–02. 
 58 Id. at 395–409. 
 59 Id. at 405–06; see also GERALD E. FRUG, CITY MAKING: BUILDING COMMUNITIES WITHOUT 
BUILDING WALLS 38 (1999) (noting that colonial towns and cities were treated as “quasi-corporation[s],” 
because, like other corporations, they wielded rights as a group yet were also “bodies politic”). 
 60 See, e.g., RHYNE, supra note 11, at 3 (noting that “the term ‘municipal corporation’ or ‘munic-
ipality’ is usually applied to incorporated cities, towns and villages having subordinate and local pow-
ers of legislation”). 
 61 See, e.g., GERALD E. FRUG & DAVID J. BARRON, CITY BOUND: HOW STATES STIFLE URBAN 
INNOVATION 211–25 (2008) (arguing that states should expand local control in areas such as reve-
nues, land use, and education, and should do so with the intent of enhancing local governments’ abil-
ity to band together with other local governments to create new, empowered regional institutions); 
DOROTHY HOLLAND ET AL., LOCAL DEMOCRACY UNDER SIEGE: ACTIVISM, PUBLIC INTERESTS, AND 
PRIVATE POLITICS 195–98 (2007) (arguing for “empowered participatory governance,” which would 
involve states recognizing and not preempting local decision making). 
 62 See, e.g., FRUG & BARRON, supra note 61, at 211–25 (arguing for a broader understanding of 
local power); David J. Barron, Reclaiming Home Rule, 116 HARV. L. REV. 2255, 2257 (2003) (exam-
ining the importance of strong home rule in the context of combatting urban sprawl). 
 63 See, e.g., SCHRAGGER, CITY POWER, supra note 18, at 63 (arguing that “the shift from Dillon’s 
Rule to home rule . . . did not change the fundamental relationship of subordination between cities and 
their states”); Paul A. Diller, Reorienting Home Rule: Part 2—Remedying the Urban Disadvantage 
Through Federalism and Localism, 77 LA. L. REV. 1045, 1077–81 (2017) (arguing for stronger con-
stitutional home rule, which immunizes local governments from state preemption of certain actions); 
Rick Su, Have Cities Abandoned Home Rule?, 44 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 181 (2017) (arguing that for 
home rule to be meaningful and powerful again, a concerted and organized effort by cities to assert 
home rule authority would be necessary). But see Robert C. Ellickson, Cities and Homeowners Asso-
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much of the work that cities do now, both functionally and politically, has im-
pacts far beyond city limits, thus falling outside of home rule authority.64 Other 
accounts have argued for a wholesale rethinking of the limits on local authori-
ty, including, for example, empowering cities to participate in regional govern-
ance networks65 and recognizing cities as “democratically responsive, politi-
cally autonomous” entities.66 Further, a small but important line of legal schol-
arship, which this Article builds from, has argued for specific legal rights for 
municipalities, most commonly focusing on constitutional—particularly First 
Amendment—rights.67 
This Part focuses on cities’ rights in a corporate context.68 It explores the 
rights that traditional corporations, such as for-profit and nonprofit corpora-
tions, possess, and those that municipal corporations possess and lack.69 It then 
                                                                                                                           
ciations, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1519, 1570–71 (1982) (arguing that cities have relatively broad powers 
under home rule and courts’ recent interpretation of city powers under state constitutions and federal 
law).  
 64 For example, cities’ attempts to regulate the environmental impacts of industry, such as oil and 
gas drilling and associated hydraulic fracturing or “fracking,” have been deemed to fall outside of 
their home rule powers. See Colo. Oil & Gas Ass’n, 369 P.3d at 579–81 (noting that fracking extends 
to formations that underlie several jurisdictions and affects national industries). 
 65 See FRUG, supra note 59, at 85–86 (“One possibility [for empowering cities] would be to shift 
the power to define the legal authority of a metropolitan region’s cities from the state government to a 
regional legislature.”). 
 66 SCHRAGGER, CITY POWER, supra note 18, at 77. 
 67 See YUDOF, supra note 11 (examining the promise and dangers of protecting governmental 
speech under the First Amendment); David J. Barron, The Promise of Cooley’s City: Traces of Local 
Constitutionalism, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 487 (1999); Fagundes, supra note 37, at 1637; Kathleen S. 
Morris, The Case for Local Constitutional Enforcement, 47 HARV. C.R.-C.L. REV. 1 (2012) (calling 
for the Supreme Court to overturn the Hunter Rule, which prohibits local governments from claiming 
constitutional protections against their own state). Richard Briffault explores a variety of actual and 
potential arguments for municipal legal rights, based in both the Constitution and state law, in the 
context of combatting “punitive preemption,” which “impose[s] harsh penalties on local officials or 
governments simply for having [state-preempted] measures on their books,” “nuclear preemption,” in 
which local governments may not regulate at all absent “affirmative state authorization,” and “new 
preemption,” which displaces “local action without replacing it with substantive state requirements.” 
See Briffault, supra note 23, at 1997 (exploring actual and potential constitutional and state law chal-
lenges to new preemption, such as Florida’s allowance for removal and fining of local officials who 
promulgate gun control laws). Josh Bendor discusses limited constitutional restraints on states at-
tempting to wield power over municipalities—embedded within individual rights and the Supremacy 
Clause—as well as independent constitutional rights that municipalities might wield, including First 
Amendment rights, property rights protected by the Takings Clause, and Due Process and Equal Pro-
tection rights vis-à-vis other cities. Josh Bendor, Note, Municipal Constitutional Rights: A New Ap-
proach, 31 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 389, 419–30 (2013). In exploring potential constitutional and 
statutory arguments to combat the “new preemption” of cities, including First Amendment rights, 
Richard Briffault notes in passing Citizens United. Briffault, supra note 23, at 17. 
 68 See discussion infra Part I. 
 69 See discussion infra Parts I.A & B. 
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explores theories that have been used to justify the rights of traditional corpo-
rations.70 
A. The Current Status of Rights Held by Business Corporations and 
Municipal Corporations 
Courts have determined that for-profit and nonprofit corporations possess 
a wide range of rights. Under the Fourth Amendment they are protected against 
“warrantless regulatory searches.”71 Under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amend-
ments they have liberty interests protected by the due process clause (in the 
form of their reputation, for example),72 and traditional corporations also avoid 
double jeopardy under the Fifth Amendment.73 Corporations also have a right 
to trial by jury, although some scholars view this as an unsettled matter.74 And, 
as much of the literature has recently described, corporations have certain 
speech rights, and the right “not to speak or be associated with speech of oth-
ers.”75 They may sue both individuals and the government; in the governmen-
tal realm, corporations count as “persons” under many statutory provisions that 
give citizens a claim against agencies for failing to perform a nondiscretionary 
duty.76 Business corporations are also free of many constitutional restrictions 
by virtue of their “private status.”77 On the flip side, corporations may be sued, 
and they lack the sovereign immunity enjoyed by city officials in some con-
texts.78 
Cities, too, enjoy some of these rights—indeed, some rights they do not 
even need due to protections they already enjoy in light of their “public sta-
                                                                                                                           
 70 See discussion infra Part I.C. 
 71 Carl J. Mayer, Personalizing the Impersonal: Corporations and the Bill of Rights, 41 HAS-
TINGS L.J. 577, 608 (1990). 
 72 Id. at 618 (citing Old Dominion Dairy Prods. v. Sec’y of Def., 631 F.2d 953 (D.C. Cir. 1980)); 
see also S. Macomb Disposal Auth. v. Washington, 790 F.2d 500, 503 (6th Cir. 1986) (finding that 
“[a] private corporation is clearly a ‘person’ within the meaning of the Equal Protection and Due Pro-
cess Clauses”). 
 73 Pollman, supra note 36, at 1656. 
 74 See Mayer, supra note 71, at 665 (listing as a corporate right the “Right to Jury Trial in Crimi-
nal Case[s]” (citing Armour Packing Co. v. United States, 209 U.S. 56 (1908) and United States v. 
R.L. Polk & Co., 438 F.2d 377, 379 (6th Cir. 1971))); Pollman, supra note 36, at 1656 (describing the 
right as “arguable” (citing Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531, 532–34 (1970))). 
 75 Pollman, supra note 36, at 1657. 
 76 Nonprofit corporations routinely sue agencies for failures to perform nondiscretionary duties, 
but other corporations, too, may and do sue. See, e.g., Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 164–67 (1997) 
(allowing irrigation districts to sue as a “person” under the Endangered Species Act); Kennecott Cop-
per Corp. v. Costle, 572 F.2d 1349, 1354 (9th Cir. 1978) (allowing a corporation to raise the claim but 
finding the lack of a mandatory agency duty). 
 77 Christopher D. Stone, Corporate Vices and Corporate Virtues: Do Public/Private Distinctions 
Matter?, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1441, 1449 (1982). 
 78 Id. 
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tus.” For example, cities, unlike private corporations, are not generally subject 
to criminal prosecutions and thus do not need shields against double jeopardy 
or a right to trial by jury.79 With respect to constitutional rights that municipali-
ties enjoy, in limited circumstances, cities are “persons” under the Fifth and 
Fourteenth Amendments for the purposes of procedural due process—such as 
asserting claims against neighboring states rather than their parent states.80 Cit-
ies may also sue federal agencies for a failure to perform a nondiscretionary 
duty.81 Municipal utilities can and do enter into contracts necessary to purchase 
goods like natural gas or electricity to provide to their resident customers, and, 
naturally, they can and do sue to enforce these contracts.82 Indeed, courts have 
confirmed that municipalities can be “injured in fact” when, for example, they 
are forced to pay money under a contract.83 And cities may sue the federal gov-
ernment or state governments for an unconstitutional taking of private property 
when, say, a government takes municipal land for a flood control project.84 
Further, those subject to the power of municipalities have reciprocal 
rights. Customers of municipal utilities can sue municipalities to enforce rights 
against these businesses, just as they can sue a private corporation.85 And cities 
                                                                                                                           
 79 See Stuart P. Green, The Criminal Prosecution of Local Governments, 72 N.C. L. REV. 1197, 
1201–13 (1994) (describing how municipalities were historically subject to state criminal prosecutions 
but noting there have been no prosecutions of municipalities since 1975). There are persuasive argu-
ments for making cities—and not just their officers—criminally liable, just as private corporations are. 
See, e.g., id. at 1198–99 (arguing that cities should be criminally liable for official policies that cause 
their officers to be criminally liable). 
 80 Michael A. Lawrence, Do “Creatures of the State” Have Constitutional Rights?: Standing for 
Municipalities to Assert Procedural Due Process Claims Against the State, 47 VILL. L. REV. 93, 109 
(2002). 
 81 See, e.g., City of Olmstead Falls v. U.S. EPA, 233 F. Supp. 2d 890, 904 (N.D. Ohio 2002) 
(finding that the agency’s action was discretionary, but not challenging the city’s ability to raise a 
claim that the agency failed to perform a nondiscretionary duty). 
 82 See, e.g., Transmission Agency of N. Cal. v. Fed. Energy Reg. Comm’n, 495 F.3d 663, 663 
(D.C. Cir. 2007) (confirming that a municipal utility had standing to challenge a federal order requir-
ing the utility to return to a transmission line operator some of the money it had received for genera-
tors’ use of its city-owned electricity transmission lines); Fla. Mun. Power Agency v. Fla. Power & 
Light Co., 81 F. Supp. 2d 1313, 1313 (M.D. Fla. 1999) (showing that a municipal utility can success-
fully sue as a third-party beneficiary to a contract). 
 83 See Transmission Agency, 495 F.3d at 670 (showing that the utility was forced to return pay-
ments under a contract ultimately enforced by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission). 
 84 United States v. 50 Acres of Land, 469 U.S. 24 (1984). 
 85 See, e.g., Pilchen v. City of Auburn, 728 F. Supp. 2d 192 (N.D.N.Y 2010) (ruling that the city’s 
requirement that a tenant pay for water services when his or her landlord fails to pay for them violated 
due process and equal protection); Bridges v. Veolia Water Indianapolis, 978 N.E.2d 447, 456–57 
(Ind. Ct. App. 2012) (recognizing a suit against a municipality and the contractor company that alleg-
edly unlawfully disconnected a customer’s water, but requiring the customer to first exhaust adminis-
trative remedies). 
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and their officials, as public entities, are also subject to constitutional claims 
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, provided qualified immunity does not apply.86 
To some degree, cities and city officials also have the rights that they 
need to represent the political and cultural views of their constituents, to pro-
ject their own and their residents’ opinions on the national and international 
stages, and to create the type of atmosphere that they have promised for their 
residents, such as a safe, “green,” family-friendly, dog-loving, or adventure-
filled place. Cities may, if not preempted, exclude certain types of activity or 
businesses through land use regulation87 and promulgate sweeping political 
measures such as progressive minimum wage laws.88 To protect their citizens 
from federally and state-approved activities deemed harmful to their jurisdic-
tion, cities may petition administrative agencies when they disagree with an 
action of that agency, such as approving a nuclear power plant.89 And in some 
cases they may contribute funds to support or oppose state referenda, including 
referenda that might affect city interests,90 although in other cases they are re-
stricted from doing so.91 In a case largely antithetical to Citizens United, the 
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts held that, pursuant to a state statute, 
municipal political fundraising or expenditures to influence state elections 
were impermissible.92 The court noted that “traditionally municipalities have 
not appropriated funds to influence election results.”93 But in a slight nod to 
First Amendment rights for municipalities, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals 
has narrowly held that cities’ elected officials—simply because they are elect-
ed officials (not local ones)—may not be forced to take certain political posi-
                                                                                                                           
 86 See Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of N.Y., 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978) (establishing that city 
officials may be sued under Section 1983); Pilchen, 728 F. Supp. 2d at 201, 204 (showing a successful 
suit against a city under Section 1983). 
 87 See, e.g., Wallach, 16 N.E.3d at 1203 (finding that despite express preemption of local control 
over hydraulic fracturing for natural gas, local governments retained land use powers to ban fracking 
within their jurisdictions). 
 88 SCHRAGGER, CITY POWER, supra note 18, at 3. 
 89 See Cty. of Suffolk v. Long Island Lighting Co., 710 F. Supp. 1387, 1390 (E.D.N.Y. 1989) (“A 
municipal corporation, like any corporation, is protected under the First Amendment in the same 
manner as an individual. The right to petition administrative agencies is a basic First Amendment 
right” (internal citations omitted)). 
 90 See Anderson v. City of Boston, 380 N.E.2d 628, 639 (Mass. 1978) (“[T]he Commonwealth 
has no right to restrict [municipal actions supporting a state referendum proposal] where there is no 
opposition from any affected citizen . . . .”); Harold Hongju Koh, The Constitutionality of Municipal 
Advocacy in Statewide Referendum Campaigns, 93 HARV. L. REV. 535, 541 (1980) (“Buckley’s rea-
soning implies that a city’s political speech includes its expenditures to express views on political 
issues.”). 
 91 Anderson, 380 N.E.2d at 639–40. 
 92 See Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 372 (protecting corporate speech rights in funding independent 
communications supporting or opposing political candidates). 
 93 Anderson, 380 N.E.2d at 634. 
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tions, such as supporting the federal government when it asks for voluntary 
local assistance with immigration enforcement.94 
Cities and city officials may also take significant steps to create a particu-
lar type of political or cultural atmosphere and project their views through pro-
prietary actions. For example, they may purchase electric vehicles for their 
fleet of city buses and maintenance trucks95 or commit to purchasing and gen-
erating one hundred percent of their power from renewable energy sources.96 
Finally, cities may vindicate certain preferences and political stances through 
litigation, as they have done on issues ranging from climate change to flawed 
bank lending practices, and as noted above in this Section.97 But these rights are 
not adequate to fill cities’ growing role, as discussed in the following Section.98 
B. Growing Obstacles to City Rights 
Cities’ ability to act as both functional and political actors is increasingly 
limited. One scholar observed that “[a] city is the only collective body in Ameri-
ca that cannot do something simply because it decides to do it.”99 Unlike 
churches, unions, traditional for-profit corporations, and similar associations, 
cities lack the “power to do what they want unless prohibited by state law.”100 
Although the rights described in Section A of this Part give cities important tools 
to act like other corporate forms by attracting resident “investors” and meeting 
the demands of these investors, municipalities still lack certain rights enjoyed by 
other corporations including, so far, a First Amendment right directly recognized 
by the Supreme Court. And state preemption has prevented local governments 
from acting in a growing number of areas in which other corporations enjoy rela-
tive freedom to act.101 Indeed, in a stark example of cities’ growing powerless-
                                                                                                                           
 94 El Cenizo, 890 F.3d at 183–84. 
 95 See, e.g., Jason Plautz, Dallas Deploys Electric Bus Fleet, SMART CITIES DIVE (July 13, 2018), 
https://www.smartcitiesdive.com/news/dallas-deploys-electric-bus-fleet/527707 [https://perma.cc/
9GRV-PUJZ]. 
 96 See HEATHER PAYNE ET AL., TRANSITIONING TO A LOWER-CARBON ENERGY FUTURE: CHAL-
LENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES FOR MUNICIPAL UTILITIES AND ELECTRIC COOPERATIVES, UNC CTR. 
FOR CLIMATE, ENERGY, ENV’T & ECON. 7 (2018), https://law.unc.edu/wp-content/uploads/2019/09/
fsuuncmuni.pdf [https://perma.cc/K63K-SZEP] (describing Austin, Texas, which is working toward 
obtaining all energy from renewable energy sources by 2050). 
 97 See Sarah L. Swan, Plaintiff Cities, 71 VAND. L. REV. 1227 (2018); see also discussion supra 
Part I.A. 
 98 See discussion infra Part I.B. 
 99 FRUG, supra note 59, at 5. 
 100 Id. 
 101 See Schragger, Attack on American Cities, supra note 18, at 1164–67 (describing how states 
increasingly use preemption to block municipal authority in areas ranging from the provision of 
broadband to prohibiting local preferences for contractors who hire a minimum number of local resi-
dents). 
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ness, Richard Schragger has documented Charlottesville, Virginia’s inability to 
remove a confederate-era statue or prevent white supremacist protesters from 
wielding intimidating weaponry on city streets, such as maces and torches.102 A 
corporate headquarters faces few such obstacles, even in the wake of state “guns 
everywhere” and open-carry legislation.103 
There are often good reasons for placing constraints on cities but not oth-
er types of corporations. Because cities wield a form of coercive power that 
most other corporations do not—over residents who do not “choose” to live 
within the jurisdiction but rather are stuck there—constitutional rights and oth-
er limitations should protect these residents.104 And federalism concerns asso-
ciated with allowing a patchwork of conflicting regulations that could impede 
efficient economic development, or could inadequately regulate this develop-
ment under a “race to the bottom,” are serious ones.105 
The drawbacks of local governmental authority, as well as legitimate but 
solvable federalism concerns, should not lead to the extreme position increas-
ingly taken by states that aggressively preempt local control. Indeed, municipal 
rights could have limits that would protect against incursions into residents’ 
individual rights. And states could and sometimes have placed reasonable 
boundaries on local governments’ regulations, thus allowing some local control 
while preventing a patchwork of conflicting laws.106 For concerns about a 
“race to the bottom,” in which local governments issue inadequately stringent 
laws to attract industry, states can and sometimes do simply place a “floor” on 
regulation, allowing only local regulations that are more protective than the 
state floor.107 But despite these options, local rights are increasingly eliminated 
altogether, or dismissed as nonexistent. 
                                                                                                                           
 102 Schragger, supra note 11, at 59–60. 
 103 See, e.g., Christine M. Quinn, Note, Reforming State Laws on How Businesses Can Ban Guns: 
“No Guns” Signs, Property Rights, and the First Amendment, 50 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 955, 957–62 
(2017) (cataloguing numerous state laws requiring guns to be allowed in bars, nightclubs, and other 
business establishments but describing the case law that still generally protects businesses’ right to 
exclude weapons from their private property, albeit with some limitations (for example, requiring 
businesses to allow guns in parking lots)). 
 104 Additionally, as noted in Part IV, many residents do not join municipalities for expressive 
reasons. But see generally BILL BISHOP, THE BIG SORT: WHY THE CLUSTERING OF LIKE-MINDED 
AMERICA IS TEARING US APART (2008) (observing that increasingly, people living in the United 
States tend to move to areas with like-minded people). 
 105 See Stewart, supra note 39, at 1211–12 (exploring the trend of municipal deregulation to at-
tract potential businesses). 
 106 See, e.g., WIS. ADMIN. CODE PSC § 128 (2012) (showing preemption of local wind energy 
regulations, which still leaves room for local regulation and specifies its allowed contours, thus avoid-
ing a patchwork of conflicting regulation while still giving local governments some control over safe-
ty and aesthetic concerns). 
 107 See generally, e.g., William W. Buzbee, Asymmetrical Regulation: Risk, Preemption, and the 
Floor/Ceiling Distinction, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1547 (2007) (describing regulatory floors); Dave Owen, 
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With respect to economic limits on city rights, states define the taxes that 
cities may or may not levy, and they regularly cap or otherwise constrain these 
taxes and the debt that cities may incur.108 Some states retain the right to in-
spect and even reject local budgets.109 And in the face of crippling debt, a ma-
jority of states restrict municipalities from restructuring their own debts.110 
Policywise, states impact local governments’ decision-making authority 
on nearly every front. At the extreme, states sometimes abolish certain local 
governments or force them to merge. For example, Indiana’s legislature forced 
Indianapolis and Marion County to merge without offering any input from citi-
zens through a mechanism such as a referendum.111 Somewhat close to this 
extreme, states like Florida, Oklahoma, and Texas have considered but not 
passed bills that would involve “nuclear preemption”—wholly prohibiting lo-
cal governments from regulating in a policy area, such as business or private 
property.112 Oklahoma’s proposed bill was the broadest; it would have prohib-
ited local governments from regulating in any state-regulated policy area with-
out the express authorization of the state.113 
Beyond attempts to preempt numerous policy areas, the use of punitive 
preemption is expanding. This occurs when states fine, remove from office, or 
otherwise punish local officials and cities who vote to enact laws preempted by 
the state.114 In Arizona, for example, if the state determines that a local govern-
ment is operating in any preempted area, the state withholds any “state shared 
monies” from that municipality.115 Like Florida, Arizona also punishes local 
governments for promulgating laws on gun control, a specifically preempted 
area, although its $50,000 fine is steeper than Florida’s $5,000 penalty.116 Other 
                                                                                                                           
Cooperative Subfederalism, 9 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 177 (2018) (observing that cooperative federalism 
exists in the state-local context). 
 108 See ACIR, supra note 25, at 152 (noting that states “decide what revenue sources local gov-
ernments can use” and also exercise heightened control over municipal debt); FRUG & BARRON, supra 
note 61, at 86 (noting that “even the cities empowered to impose income or occupation taxes remain 
subject to extensive state regulation” because states cap local taxes that may be charged); Erin Scharff, 
Preemption and Fiscal Authority, 45 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1270, 1273, 1277 (2018) (noting state limits 
on “local governments’ abilities both to tax and to borrow” and that “state law restricts municipal 
authority over fiscal affairs more than it does in other policy areas”). 
 109 ACIR, supra note 25, at 152. 
 110 See Samir D. Parikh & Zhaochen He, Failing Cities and the Red Queen Phenomenon, 58 B.C. 
L. REV. 599, 601–02 (2017) (highlighting how municipalities lack adequate power to restructure their 
finances, thus sometimes causing their economic demise). 
 111 ACIR, supra note 25, at 152. 
 112 Briffault, supra note 23, at 2007–08. 
 113 Id. at 2007. 
 114 Id. at 2002–06. 
 115 Id. at 2005 (citing ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41-194.01 (2018)). 
 116 Id. at 2004–05 (citing ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3108(I) (2018)). 
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states have considered similar punitive preemptive efforts in the immigration 
space.117 
Beyond these “nuclear” and “punitive” preemptive measures, states are 
simply preempting local government action in more substantive areas, and 
simultaneously preempting these areas more broadly. States have preempted 
local regulation of hydraulic fracturing, anti-discrimination laws, minimum 
wage and workers’ rights provisions, plastic bag bans, and ride-sharing safety, 
among many other local laws.118 
Alongside the increasing breadth of state preemption, courts have also de-
nied municipal rights altogether. The Supreme Court has gone so far as to state 
that a municipality, as opposed to a private corporation, has “no privileges or 
immunities under the federal constitution” as asserted against states.119 And the 
Court in Hunter v. City of Pittsburgh declared that a state “at its pleasure, may 
modify or withdraw all” municipal powers and thus is “unrestrained by any pro-
vision of the Constitution of the United States.”120 The Court accordingly assert-
ed that municipalities lack any constitutional rights. As one scholar notes, this 
language, “if taken seriously, would appear to foreclose any serious contention 
that the Federal Constitution protects a measure of local governmental freedom 
from state control.”121 Other cases reach similar conclusions. In the First 
Amendment context, the majority of courts that have addressed whether munici-
palities have First Amendment rights have answered the question in the nega-
tive.122 The Supreme Court has determined that “[t]he First Amendment protects 
                                                                                                                           
 117 See Erin Adele Scharff, Hyper Preemption: A Reordering of the State-Local Relationship?, 
106 GEO. L.J. 1469, 1498–99 (2018) (describing proposed bills in eight states that would penalize 
local governments for adopting sanctuary city legislation). 
 118 See Briffault, supra note 23, at 2000 (noting states’ preemption of local efforts to address food 
deserts and other nutrition challenges as well as local regulation of “pesticides, tobacco products, e-
cigarettes, factory farms, and fire sprinkler installation in new homes,” among other preemptive 
measures); Scharff, supra note 117, at 1484 (noting similar preempted areas and providing additional 
examples, such as preemption of local regulation of factory farming and requirements for paid sick 
days); Schragger, Attack on American Cities, supra note 18, at 1173 (exploring the various areas 
preempted by states). 
 119 Ysursa, 555 U.S. at 363. Business corporations also lack privileges and immunities protection, 
but the Ysursa language referred to all constitutional privileges—not just the Privileges and Immuni-
ties Clause. 
 120 207 U.S. 161, 178–79 (1907) (emphasis added). This could, of course, simply be a statement 
of federalism principles. But it goes further. The Court here does not simply imply that states may 
preempt local control or even dissolve local governments; it also expressly asserts municipalities’ lack 
of constitutional rights. See id. (“The power is in the state, and those who legislate for the state are 
alone responsible for any unjust or oppressive exercise of it.”). 
 121 Barron, supra note 67, at 562. 
 122 Fagundes, supra note 37, at 1641–43. 
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the press from governmental interference; it confers no analogous protection on 
the Government,”123 and other courts have tended to follow suit.124 
C. Theories Justifying Non-Municipal Corporate Rights 
Theories that explain the reasons for the existence of private (non-
municipal) corporations—and the rights they deserve—are as abundant and 
varied as the modern forms and types of corporations. Many are primarily eco-
nomic in their orientation, focusing on the nature and meaning of the “firm” in 
terms of its efficiency and efficacy for organizing and managing resources over 
time. Following economists’ development of the theory of the firm in the 
1920s and 1930s, the legal literature picked up the concept, although it did not 
flourish in the literature until the late 1970s and beyond.125 Under this ap-
proach, the firm exists for functional economic reasons—that is to organize the 
“suppliers of factors of production” and associated contracts within a central 
entity, thus lowering the transaction costs of production.126 A large body of this 
literature follows a “nexus of contracts” theory, focusing specifically on the 
delegation of contracting authority to a third party (the corporation), thereby 
freeing each member from having to individually contract for services, goods, 
and the like.127 
In another functionalist approach to the firm, which centrally draws on is-
sues of liability, Henry Hansmann and Reinier Kraakman argue that the key 
                                                                                                                           
 123 CBS v. Democratic Nat’l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 139 (1973) (Stewart, J., concurring) (emphasis 
omitted). 
 124 Fagundes, supra note 37, at 1643 (noting that the Colombia Broadcasting reasoning has been 
followed in subsequent cases, though not examined in close detail). But see El Cenizo, 890 F.3d at 184 
(providing for very narrow protection of elected officials’ speech rights, including local elected offi-
cials). 
 125 See Kenneth E. Scott, Corporation Law and the American Law Institute Corporate Govern-
ance Project, 35 STAN. L. REV. 927, 930 (1983) (observing that the “development of a theory of the 
firm can be traced back to Knight and Coase” but grew “most rapidly” in the 1970s and early 1980s). 
Coase in 1937 argued that economists had failed to fully define the “firm” as used in the economics 
literature or explain why, within firms—unlike general markets—production is directed by a coordi-
nator through vertical integration, rather than primarily on price signals in a series of market exchang-
es. See R.H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386, 386–89 (1937). Coase further argued 
that firms are primarily organized due to various costs of using the traditional market price mechanism 
to obtain the factors of production (such as, in the cotton industry, power (energy), shop rooms, 
looms, and yarn), as opposed to a coordinator. Id. at 388, 390. He noted the efficiencies of avoiding 
separate contracts for each and every exchange and of avoiding shorter contracts for reasons of trans-
action costs or risk, for example, and how certain governmental interventions—such as sales taxes or 
quotas and price controls—apply to individual transactions within markets but not within firms, thus 
also potentially applying to business transactions toward organizations of firms. Id. at 391–93. 
 126 Scott, supra note 125, at 930. 
 127 See Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 2, at 391 (describing the “nexus of contracts” theory 
that allows a group of people to effectively coordinate actions). 
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reason for forming a corporation is “asset partitioning”—the formation of a 
“designated pool of assets that are available to satisfy claims by the firm’s 
creditors” and are “distinct from assets owned by the firm’s owners or manag-
ers.”128 Focusing on assets from a different angle, several theories emphasize 
firms’ ability to pool and secure assets and make them more durable from one 
generation of business leadership to the next. Individual entities may leave the 
firm and give up their claim to some of its assets, but they may not walk away 
with those assets. The exit of individuals and their associated property inter-
ests, in other words, does not dismantle the firm’s assets.129 
Other approaches are more metaphysical, focusing on the very nature or 
“ontology” of groups and their meaning, separate and apart from their practi-
cal, economic, or moral functions. Under the “real entity” approach, some 
view the corporation as an entity unto itself—a separate being capable of hav-
ing its own opinions, beliefs, and values.130 British pluralists—early corporate 
theorists—held this view, building upon still earlier theory that viewed the 
corporation as an independent living creature.131 Others argue that the corpora-
tion merely channels or represents the views of its members, voicing certain 
members’ individual views or providing a collective voice that represents a 
consensus of at least a sub-group of members. The Court in Hobby Lobby 
largely embraced this member-based or “aggregation” approach, emphasizing 
that “[c]orporations, ‘separate and apart from’ the human beings who own, run, 
and are employed by them, cannot do anything at all” and that when “rights, 
                                                                                                                           
 128 Id. at 393. 
 129 See, e.g., Margaret M. Blair, Locking in Capital: What Corporate Law Achieved for Business 
Organizers in the Nineteenth Century, 51 UCLA L. REV. 387, 390 (2003) (arguing that “the ability to 
commit capital, once amassed, for extended periods of time” was a key reason for the formation of 
corporations) (emphasis omitted); Morgan Ricks, Organizational Law as Commitment Device, 70 
VAND. L. REV. 1303, 1306–08 (2017) (arguing that even traditional partnerships, although they could 
be dissolved, “sought to preserve existing configurations of business assets upon dissolution” and did 
not allow exiting partners to “assert property interests in specific business assets upon dissolution,” 
and arguing that Blair’s “locking in capital” theory could in fact apply to traditional partnerships, not 
just corporations). Hansmann and Kraakman also note a separate literature that focuses on the need to 
prevent the disassembly of “transactional relationships that ha[ve] been costly to assemble” or an 
“organization’s accumulated experience with working procedures and forms of organization,” not just 
monetary assets. Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 2, at 391 n.5 (citing Raghuram Rajan & Luigi 
Zingales, The Firm as a Dedicated Hierarchy: A Theory of the Origin and Growth of Firms (Nat’l 
Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 7546, 1998)). 
 130 See Jay B. Kesten, Shareholder Political Primacy, 10 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 161, 170 (2016) 
(“The real entity theory posits that corporations exist independently of their constituents or the statutes 
authorizing them, and are thus a distinct entity entitled to all (or at least most) of the rights of natural 
persons.”). 
 131 See Richard Schragger & Micah Schwartzman, Some Realism About Corporate Rights, in THE 
RISE OF CORPORATE RELIGIOUS LIBERTY 345, 349–50 (Micah Schwartzman et al. eds., 2016) (citing 
to pluralist sources and their reliance on the earlier work of Otto Gierke). 
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whether constitutional or statutory, are extended to corporations, the purpose is 
to protect the rights of these people.”132 
There is also a large debate surrounding the public versus private nature 
of the traditional corporation—whether a corporation is merely a product of 
individual choice and contracting, or is alternatively more embedded within 
the public sphere and thus responsible for effects beyond the contracting indi-
viduals who are members of the corporation.133 In a somewhat different vein, 
another line of literature focuses on the corporation as a distinctly “private” 
form of governance that allows individuals to wield important decentralized 
power by governing themselves—allowing problems to “be attacked by and 
left to the final decision of those living closest to them.”134 In this vein, corpo-
rations are compared to governmental sub-units in that they better respond to 
individual preferences and have more “socially constructive energies” than do 
overloaded, centralized entities.135 
Gerald Frug argues that if corporate rights are to be justified by this ar-
gument for the decentralization of power, “cities could perform these tasks as 
well as corporations now do.”136 This line of debate views the corporation 
through the private lens—as being organized to better respond to its members, 
and not for society as a whole. But as Frug observes, municipalities could very 
well serve this function—for example, by creating “city banks and city insur-
ance companies” that better responded to citizens’ preferences in these are-
as.137 This Article, which argues for a focus on local governments’ “corporate-
type” functions in a rights-based or preemption analysis, borrows from Frug’s 
approach.138 It proposes that courts more closely examine local governments’ 
ability to provide essential public services, create diverse physical and political 
spaces for citizen “footvoters,” and support innovation and economic growth, 
for example. 
Beyond considering corporate and municipal purposes, this Article also 
argues that courts should focus on whether granting rights to a municipality or 
protecting the municipality against preemption would further the purposes of 
                                                                                                                           
 132 573 U.S. 682, 707–08 (2014); Kesten, supra note 130, at 170 (observing that the aggregation 
theory “concludes that corporations must . . . have whatever powers and privileges necessary to vindi-
cate the rights of those underlying constituents”). 
 133 See Pollman, supra note 36, at 1631–39 (examining shifting conceptions of the corporation as 
existing for public or private purposes). 
 134 Kingman Brewster, Jr., The Corporation and Economic Federalism, in THE CORPORATION IN 
MODERN SOCIETY 72, 75–76 (Edward S. Mason ed., 1959). 
 135 Id. at 75. 
 136 Gerald E. Frug, The City as a Legal Concept, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1059, 1143 (1980). 
 137 Id. at 1150. 
 138 See supra note 38 (noting that this Article does not attempt to revive the rejected formal “pub-
lic-private” division that used to define local government liability, but rather emphasizes the inter-
twinement of public and more corporate “private” purposes within cities and for-profit corporations). 
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the right or preemption. In this sense, it follows a more functionalist approach 
to corporate rights, of the type advocated by scholars such as Elizabeth Poll-
man. Pollman argues that corporations should have rights if granting those 
rights would achieve the objectives associated with the rights.139 
II. THE CORPORATION DEFINED 
Municipal corporations are merely one entity within the sprawling defini-
tional category of the corporation, yet, as shown in Part I, the courts tend to 
exclude them from corporate rights, allowing states to increasingly preempt 
their powers.140 Because corporations are artificially created entities—owing 
their entire existence to state law—the project of defining a corporation inher-
ently involves questions of value and purpose. This Part accordingly defines 
corporations by focusing on the many purposes for which corporations are cre-
ated and legally recognized. While undertaking this definitional analysis, it 
places municipalities firmly within the definition of corporate actors. 
Merely stating that a municipality is, formally speaking, a “corporation,” 
is a formalistic argument with little purchase. The goal of re-focusing on the 
corporate identity of the municipality is a deeper one. This Part explores how 
municipalities carry out the purposes that courts and scholars envision other 
types of corporations achieving—specifically, what a municipal corporation 
does for its members and for society. This, in turn, suggests why the munici-
pality deserves the rights afforded to other corporations under the rationale of 
societal benefit.141 
Associations, for the purposes of this Article, are groups of natural per-
sons who join together to form a separate, individual, legally recognized enti-
ty.142 Most of the entities within this category are labeled as “corporations.”143 
They have numerous, and often varied, purposes and functions, and they take a 
                                                                                                                           
 139 Pollman, supra note 36, at 1675. 
 140 See discussion supra Part I. 
 141 See discussion infra Part II. 
 142 For definitions of “firms”—another way of describing an association—see, e.g., Hansmann & 
Kraakman, supra note 2, at 392–93 (describing legal entities as having “(1) a well-defined ability to 
contract through designated managers, and (2) a designated pool of assets that are available to satisfy 
claims by the firm’s creditors,” and distinguishing firms from natural persons in that a firm’s “bond-
ing assets are, at least in part, distinct from assets owned by the firm’s owners or managers,” meaning 
that creditors would claim the firm’s assets before claiming those of the “personal creditors of the 
firm’s owners or managers”). Some have even persuasively argued that corporations need not have 
natural persons as members. See Shawn Bayern, The Implications of Modern Business-Entity Law for 
the Regulation of Autonomous Systems, 19 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 93, 96 (2015). 
 143 See, e.g., Margaret M. Blair, Corporate Personhood and the Corporate Persona, 2013 U. ILL. 
L. REV. 785, 786 (“When a corporation is formed, the law immediately recognizes the existence of a 
new legal entity that is separate from the organizers and investors, an entity that can carry out certain 
business activities as a ‘person.’”). 
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growing variety of forms.144 There are homeowners’ associations, typically 
organized as nonprofit corporations, that enforce detailed private covenants, 
own certain infrastructure, and provide services within subdivisions.145 There 
are many types of business corporations and partnerships that differ in terms of 
liability and tax treatment, obligations to shareholders, and the activities in 
which they may engage. For example, a traditional business corporation pri-
marily acts in the interests of its shareholders.146 A “public benefit corpora-
tion,” in contrast, allowed by many states, “balances the stockholders’ pecuni-
ary interests, the best interests of those materially affected by the corporation’s 
conduct, and the public benefit or public benefits identified in its certificate of 
incorporation.”147 Additionally, there are for-profit taxpaying charities148 and 
nonprofit tax-exempt charities. But despite these many differences, several 
shared features allow for the lumping of these many entities into one defini-
tional category.149 And this lumping, in turn, allows for an exploration of how 
                                                                                                                           
 144 For a description of the types of associations that exist in the United States, see Hansmann & 
Kraakman, supra note 2, at 390 (noting “standard-form legal entities” in the United States as includ-
ing “the business corporation, the cooperative corporation, the nonprofit corporation, the municipal 
corporation, the limited liability company, the general partnership, the limited partnership, the private 
trust, the charitable trust, and marriage,” among others); see also Blair & Pollman, supra note 1, at 
1678–79 (noting the expansion of the types of corporate form by the early twentieth century, includ-
ing “large, branded, publicly traded corporations” as well as “nonprofits, cooperatives, political units, 
clubs, and advocacy associations,” among others). 
 145 CMTY. ASS’NS INST., NATIONAL AND STATE STATISTICAL REVIEW FOR 2016 COMMUNITY 
ASSOCIATION DATA 1 (2016), https://www.caionline.org/AboutCommunityAssociations/Statistical
%20Information/2016StatsReviewFBWeb.pdf [https://perma.cc/WYT4-CVEG] (estimating that in 
2017 there were more than 345,000 homeowners associations in the United States). 
 146 There is a large debate in the literature as to whether corporations should primarily benefit the 
corporation itself and shareholders or society more generally, but corporate law, as it stands, primarily 
follows the former view. For a discussion of the debate, see, e.g., Adolf A. Berle, Corporate Powers 
as Powers in Trust, 44 HARV. L. REV. 1049, 1049 (1931) (arguing that “all powers granted to a corpo-
ration . . . are necessarily and at all times exercisable only for the ratable benefit of all the sharehold-
ers”); E. Merrick Dodd, Jr., For Whom Are Corporate Managers Trustees?, 45 HARV. L. REV. 1145, 
1148 (1932) (arguing that the business corporation is an “economic institution which has a social 
service as well as a profit-making function”); Robert C. Hughes, Exploitation, Deontological Con-
straints, and Shareholder Theory, 17 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 1007, 1008 (2019). 
 147 See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 362 (2019) (explicitly allowing the creation of “public 
benefit corporations”). 
 148 See Anup Malani & Eric A. Posner, The Case for For-Profit Charities, 93 VA. L. REV. 2017, 
2019–20 (2007) (describing what the authors believed to be the first for-profit charity, formed by 
Google); Usha Rodrigues, Entity and Identity, 60 EMORY L.J. 1257, 1260 (2011) (describing a grow-
ing number of for-profit charities and an increasingly blurry boundary between for-profit and nonprof-
it entities). 
 149 Several elements of my definitional category track the essential elements identified by corpo-
rate law scholars, although I add elements that are not always included in these accounts. For exam-
ple, Margaret Blair includes four essential aspects of the corporate status, including “[p]roviding con-
tinuity and a clear line of succession in the holding of property and the carrying out of contracts” 
(related to the “self-perpetuating” function described here); “[p]roviding an ‘identifiable persona’ to 
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and why the shared traits of corporations are important—in other words, how 
they can benefit their members and society at large. 
A. Self-Perpetuating 
As defined here, all corporations are self-perpetuating; when the members 
and management leave or change, the corporation does not. This is one of the 
central defining characteristics of a corporation, and has been since their incep-
tion. Early treatises on corporate law note that “[o]ne essential characteristic of 
a corporation is an indefinite duration, by a continued accession of new mem-
bers to supply the place of those who are removed by death, or other 
means.”150 Similarly, John Dillon—a federal judge, famous land use treatise 
writer, and the creator of “Dillon’s Rule” of limited local government pow-
ers—wrote that the most important characteristics of corporations “are contin-
uous legal identity or unity, and perpetual or indefinite succession under the 
corporate name, notwithstanding successive changes, by death or otherwise, in 
the corporators or members [of the corporation].”151 
In the case of the municipal corporation, the City of San Francisco, for 
example, retains its status as a singular, legally recognized entity even as in-
habitants move in and out and are born or die, and as the people occupying the 
positions of city councilmembers and mayor change.152 The city’s policies and 
the package of services it provides to residents also change over time, but the 
city itself—absent a major reordering, such as a decision by the State of Cali-
fornia to revoke the city’s charter—remains. The city retains its status as the 
distinct entity of “San Francisco” for issuing bonds, enacting and enforcing 
ordinances, taxing residents, and so on. The same is true of for-profit and non-
profit corporations and the like; members join or leave, management turns 
over, and missions change, but the corporation as a distinct, legally recognized 
entity remains. 
                                                                                                                           
serve as a central actor in carrying out the business activity,” including the ability to “sue and be sued 
in its own name;” “[p]roviding a mechanism for separating pools of assets according to which assets 
are dedicated to the business, and which assets are the personal assets of the human persons who are 
participating in the enterprise;” and “[p]roviding a framework for self-governance by the participants 
in the enterprise.” Blair does not include approval by government as a definitional feature, but that is 
likely because her definition is a functional one, focusing on the functions that make corporations 
effective, legal “persons.” Blair, supra note 143, at 787–88. 
 150 1 Stewart Kyd, A Treatise on the Law of Corporations 2 (1793). 
 151 1 John F. Dillon, Commentaries on the Law of Municipal Corporations 57 (5th ed. 1911). 
 152 See, e.g., Brian M. McCall, The Corporation as Imperfect Society, 36 DEL. J. CORP. L. 509, 
530–31 (2011) (describing the early Roman association of the “universitas” and exploring its similari-
ty to cities) (“The universitas was not limited to the lives or agreement of a particular set of individu-
als. Its identity and ability to sue and be sued remained despite changes in, or even a complete turno-
ver of, its original membership. . . . A new city is not formed as citizens are born and die. The same 
city or corporate body continues.”). 
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The importance of this self-perpetuating status relates to the legal person-
hood theory of corporations introduced in Part I and discussed in further detail 
here. Because the corporation remains the same entity despite changes in the 
composition of its management and directors, the corporation can act as effec-
tively as an independent legal entity, “[p]roviding continuity and a clear line of 
succession in the holding of property and the carrying out of contracts.”153 
More broadly, the ongoing existence of a separate legal entity that indi-
vidual members may choose to join or leave over time creates a continuous, 
relatively clear signal about the nature and character of the corporation and 
whether it will further the goals of the potential member. Members considering 
whether to join a corporation may investigate the history of its actions to de-
termine whether the corporation is likely to provide a good return on the indi-
vidual’s investment or achieve a social goal. This is true for municipal corpora-
tions, too, which residents “join” by moving.154 As with all organizations, the 
choice to join a municipality is a packaged choice—the resident may dislike 
the municipality’s land use laws, worrying that the laws will not protect the 
value of her home (a major investment), but might favor the municipality’s 
social and environmental policies.155 The existence of the municipality as a 
perpetual, independent entity, however, allows for the potential resident to 
identify the various elements of the “packaged” corporation she might join. 
B. Comprised of Members, Yet Possessing Independent Legal Personhood 
Closely related to their self-perpetuating function is the ontological notion 
that corporations are “legal persons,” albeit artificial ones. Legal personhood 
has many definitions, but all generally coalesce around the fact that the corpo-
ration, as a fictional person, has not only members but also an independent, 
separate, singular identity from those members.156 The many definitions of 
legal personhood also consistently include notions of legal abilities, liabilities, 
                                                                                                                           
 153 Blair, supra note 143, at 787. 
 154 See Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL. ECON. 416, 418 
(1956) (describing how resident footvoters shop among communities based on the goods and services 
the communities offer). 
 155 Cf. Lee Anne Fennell, Contracting Communities, 2004 U. ILL. L. REV. 829, 896 (noting that, 
for private homeowners association-governed communities, the large sets of restrictions are packaged 
together and suggesting alternatives, such as an “a la carte menu of use restrictions”). 
 156 But see Bayern, supra note 142, at 96 (arguing that “modern LLC statutes in the United States 
appear to permit the development of ‘memberless’ legal entities—that is, legal persons whose actions 
are determined solely by agreement or algorithm, not in any ongoing fashion by human members or 
owners”). The courts, however, have generally rejected the view of the corporation as a separate entity 
from its members, instead arguing that the corporation is its members, to the consternation of many 
scholars. See Jonathan Macey & Leo E. Strine, Jr., Citizens United as Bad Corporate Law, 2019 WIS. 
L. REV. 451, 454–55 (arguing that the courts consistently, and incorrectly, view corporations as exten-
sions of their members and as possessing the rights of their members); see also supra note 132. 
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or rights that attach to the corporation. In other words, the corporation may do 
certain things within the legal sphere—as if it were a human being signing a 
contract or walking into a courtroom—and may be liable for certain things and 
possess certain legal rights. As Margaret Blair puts it, “[w]hen a corporation is 
formed, the law immediately recognizes the existence of a new legal entity that 
is separate from the organizers and investors, an entity that can carry out cer-
tain business activities as a ‘person.’”157 
There are competing views as to the extent of this personhood and the le-
gal abilities, liabilities, and rights it confers. For example, Elizabeth Pollman 
argues that early conceptions of corporate personhood were limited to the abil-
ity of the corporation to address the “property and contract interests of share-
holders,” but that the Court has problematically overextended that rationale—
by, for example, attaching criminal liability and commercial and political 
speech rights to the corporation, in an “ad hoc” manner.158 Professor Pollman 
would limit the rights defining corporate personhood to cover only rights that 
protect the underlying members of the corporation—a starting point that she 
believes would lead to more productive analysis of the particular rights the 
corporation should hold.159 Shawn Bayern focuses more on the functional as-
pects of legal personhood, defining it as “the capacity of a person, system, or 
legal entity to be recognized by law sufficiently to perform basic legal func-
tions,” including “the ability to participate in the fundamental relationships 
regulated by private law.”160 
In the context of the corporation being liable for its actions, Pamela Bucy 
argues that there is a “corporate ethos” that is separate both from the individual 
members and managers of the corporation and from the corporation’s technical 
functions, such as “manufacturing, retailing, [or] finance.”161 This ethos in-
volves a particular corporate culture and personality—as evidenced, for exam-
ple, by corporate goals, the extent to which the corporation monitors “compli-
ance with legal requirements” or trains employees about legal requirements, 
and the hierarchy of the corporation.162 
                                                                                                                           
 157 Blair, supra note 143, at 786. 
 158 Pollman, supra note 36, at 1630. 
 159 Id. Other scholars and jurists have expressed the view that the separate legal personality of 
corporations should prevent them from holding certain rights. See, e.g., Macey & Strine, supra note 
156, at 545–55 (arguing that corporations should be treated as separate legal entities, not as associa-
tions of citizens bearing the rights of those citizens, and that as separate legal entities, corporations do 
not “have constitutional rights equal to human beings”). 
 160 Bayern, supra note 142, at 94–95. 
 161 Pamela H. Bucy, Corporate Ethos: A Standard for Imposing Corporate Criminal Liability, 75 
MINN. L. REV. 1095, 1123 (1991). 
 162 Id. at 1129–39. 
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Municipal corporations fit squarely within both the narrower and more 
expansive definitions of legal personhood. Like other corporations, they have 
members (residents), yet they also maintain a separate legal status from those 
members.163 As “legal persons,” municipal corporations may, and consistently 
do, own and manage large swaths of property, such as city or town offices, 
courthouses, public parks, recreation centers, schools, and commercial build-
ings.164 As with other corporations, this ownership allows them to further the 
goals of their members. For example, a growing number of municipalities are 
choosing to “municipalize” their power supply; rather than having residents 
purchase electricity from an investor-owned utility, these municipalities build 
and own their own electricity generation or purchase electricity and sell it to 
residents.165 This movement is largely the result of residents demanding a 
greener, lower-carbon energy supply. 
Beyond owning and managing property, municipalities also regularly 
contract with other entities to have infrastructure built or provide services, and 
they regularly sue and are sued.166 Indeed, the Court has explicitly defined 
municipalities as “persons” who may be sued in some capacity.167 This allows 
individuals to hold municipalities liable when an official policy causes a con-
stitutional violation, although a number of hurdles—largely the difficulty of 
showing official policy or custom—have made this showing relatively rare.168 
                                                                                                                           
 163 Corporations’ independence from their natural person members is often cited as a reason not to 
extend certain rights to the corporation, such as the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination. 
See, e.g., Mayer, supra note 71, at 655 (arguing that “[n]owhere in the law . . . is the dissonance be-
tween a corporation and a person as great as in the Bill of Rights context”); cf. HENRY N. BUTLER & 
LARRY E. RIBSTEIN, THE CORPORATION AND THE CONSTITUTION 143–44 (1995) (arguing that be-
cause corporations are an entity formed by a nexus of contracts, and not a person, they should not 
have a right against self-incrimination); Macey & Strine, supra note 156, at 493 (agreeing with the 
court cases that deny the corporation—which is a separate legal entity from its members—the Fifth 
Amendment rights against self-incrimination while granting individual officers and stockholders a 
personal right against self-incrimination). 
 164 See Ellickson, supra note 63, at 1570–71 (noting cities’ ownership of commercial properties 
and businesses). 
 165 See, e.g., Shelley Welton, Public Energy, 92 N.Y.U. L. REV. 267, 290 (2017) (noting that, at 
that time, 2,028 municipally owned energy systems served over fourteen percent of residential cus-
tomers of electricity in the United States). 
 166 For a discussion of municipalities’ broad involvement in lawsuits, see generally Swan, supra 
note 97. 
 167 See Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of N.Y., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978) (determining that local 
governments are “persons” for the purposes of Section 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1983, and may be sued for “execution of a government’s policy or custom” but not “for an injury 
inflicted solely by its employees or agents”). 
 168 See, e.g., Edward C. Dawson, Replacing Monell Liability with Qualified Immunity for Munici-
pal Defendants in 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Litigation, 86 U. CIN. L. REV. 483, 498 (2018) (“Meeting the 
Supreme Court’s tests [for custom and official municipal policy] requires plaintiffs to pursue discov-
ery not only into the facts and events of the particular case, but more broadly into municipal docu-
ments and records relating to policy, custom, discipline, training, and other, similar incidents.”). 
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More broadly, as discussed in Part I, a limited number of courts have recog-
nized certain municipal rights, as if these municipalities were indeed “per-
sons.”169 For example, some courts have held that under the First Amendment, 
municipalities have the right to petition an administrative agency170 and may 
not be required to “endorse” or refrain from endorsing certain state policies.171 
In the context of petitioning a federal agency, the U.S. District Court for 
the Eastern District of New York observed in Suffolk v. Long Island Lighting 
Co. that the municipality had the right to assert its view that a proposed nuclear 
facility posed a danger to the government’s residents. It did not, however, as-
sert that in this sense, the municipality was acting like a traditional government 
representing its citizens. Rather, it emphasized that the corporation, “like any 
corporation, is protected under the First Amendment in the same manner as an 
individual.”172 In a separate ruling striking down a Texas provision that prohib-
ited local officials from endorsing sanctuary city status, however, the U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit focused solely on the city’s governmen-
tal role—finding that strict scrutiny applies to restrictions placed on the speech 
of any elected official, such as an official advocating a certain position in a 
town hall meeting.173 
Much like corporate “ethos”—a status of corporate personhood identified 
by some scholars—municipalities, like for-profit corporations, have distinct 
cultures. City managers, mayors, and city councilmembers can be either bene-
ficially hands-on or too inactive when it comes to monitoring the actions of 
city employees or training employees with respect to legal requirements. For 
example, the City of Miami Beach—responding to apparently lax management 
of potential corruption—recently issued new rules requiring employees to re-
port bribery and official misconduct, with the City Manager emphasizing that 
these rules would be closely enforced and that “[r]eporting of these offenses is 
mandatory.”174 
                                                                                                                           
 169 See discussion supra Part I.A. 
 170 Cty. of Suffolk v. Long Island Lighting Co., 710 F. Supp. 1387, 1390 (E.D.N.Y. 1989) (“Suf-
folk had . . . a constitutional right under the First Amendment to speak and act in opposition to [the] 
Shoreham [Nuclear Power Facility].”). 
 171 City of El Cenizo v. Texas, 890 F.3d 164, 184–85 (5th Cir. 2018). 
 172 Cty. of Suffolk, 710 F. Supp. at 1390. 
 173 El Cenizo, 890 F.3d at 184 (“The state cannot regulate the substance of elected officials’ 
speech under the First Amendment without passing the strict scrutiny test.”). 
 174 Tim Elfrink, Miami Beach Requires Workers to Report Bribery as Top Official Faces Corruption 
Probe, MIAMI NEW TIMES (Aug. 30, 2017), http://www.miaminewtimes.com/news/miami-beach-issues-
new-bribery-rules-as-top-official-faces-corruption-case-9630957 [https://perma.cc/HJ89-X4FN]. 
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C. Holding Independent Assets 
One aspect of legal personhood noted above is the ability to hold proper-
ty, but this aspect is often singled out as a separate, essential definitional char-
acteristic of a corporation. This is because “legal personhood” focuses more 
closely on the ability of the corporation to act in various legal capacities, such 
as owning property and entering contracts, whereas asset ownership focuses on 
a more particular function of property ownership: the fact that corporations 
hold resources independently of their members. The members contribute many 
of these assets, yet the assets of the corporation are separate and separately 
reachable by creditors.175 
Hansmann and Kraakman emphasize the efficiencies that arise from col-
lecting individual assets into a common, separate pool. If a group of people 
wish to gather together to obtain a loan or other form of credit to purchase ma-
chinery for a manufacturing plant or services that will benefit the group, they 
can much more easily obtain credit based on one common pool of assets—
creditors need only have “familiarity with the firm’s own assets and business 
affairs.”176 If, in contrast, creditors had to individually determine each mem-
ber’s contribution of assets to the corporation and the creditworthiness of each 
member, credit costs would be quite high.177 
Similarly, a municipality can more easily obtain credit for the construc-
tion of needed infrastructure, such as sewage and drinking water lines, with a 
separate, common pool of assets. Although these assets are collected in the 
form of taxes, rather than voluntary investment by corporate members, their 
function is the same as that of a more traditional corporation. A creditor can 
more easily ascertain the risk of loaning to a city as compared to evaluating the 
creditworthiness of each resident of the city who might invest in a shared in-
frastructure project. Furthermore, the existence of a separate pool of assets cre-
ates economies of scale and minimizes coordination costs. It is more difficult 
for residents to pool together their own assets and collectively bargain for in-
frastructure or services than it is for the municipality to take on this task on 
behalf of its members. 
D. Self-Governing 
Closely related to legal personhood and a corporation’s ownership of as-
sets is the fact that the corporation also governs itself; even for-profit corpora-
                                                                                                                           
 175 See Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 2, at 402 (describing the firm function of pooling 
assets for efficiency reasons). 
 176 Id. 
 177 See id. (noting large transaction costs). 
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tions are mini governments in many respects.178 In the case of traditional cor-
porations, individuals choose to join and consent to the corporation’s rules and 
coercive powers by purchasing stock.179 The corporate members can then in-
fluence the decisions of the corporation through proxy votes and similar mech-
anisms, although, as discussed in Part III, stockholder influence is quite limited 
in many respects.180 
The municipal corporation is, of course, more traditionally recognized as 
a “governing” entity, which runs its own affairs through an elected legislative 
body, such as a city commission, council, or board of selectmen, and often an 
“executive” such as a mayor. Members of municipal corporations choose to 
join and be subject to the government’s coercive power by moving there or 
electing not to leave. Individuals’ choice here is of course much more con-
strained than in the context of a for-profit corporation. Often, residents find 
themselves stuck within the jurisdiction of a local government due to limited 
mobility and could not be accurately described as having affirmatively selected 
that government as their representative. 
E. Approved by Government 
Legally recognized associations, as opposed to informal groupings of 
people, are self-governing but must receive some sort of approval from a high-
er governmental authority—typically a state. In short, they must be chartered. 
There are competing theories that argue against this “concession” view of cor-
porations, asserting that the “corporation exists prior to and separate from the 
state” and need only obtain the consent of its members, not the state.181 But 
even if one views corporations primarily as the product of their shareholders, 
the technical reality holds that in order for any form of “legal” association to 
take certain actions, it must first demonstrate that it meets state-defined criteria. 
                                                                                                                           
 178 See Blair, supra note 143, at 787 (“Although corporations are not often regarded primarily as 
units of governance, in fact, self-governance was one of the earliest purposes of incorporation.”). 
 179 The argument that corporations, like more traditional governments, have coercive powers 
over individuals is primarily an older one voiced by “legal pluralists.” Dalia Tsuk, Corporations 
Without Labor: The Politics of Progressive Corporate Law, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1861, 1881 (2003). 
For a classic legal pluralist view, see Robert L. Hale, Coercion and Distribution in a Supposedly Non-
Coercive State, 38 POL. SCI. Q. 470 (1923) (rejecting the public-private distinction). See generally, 
e.g., ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE 
PROPERTY (1932). 
 180 See infra note 311 and accompanying text. 
 181 See David Millon, Theories of the Corporation, 1990 DUKE L.J. 201, 211 (describing “natural 
entity theory,” in which “[t]he conception of the corporation as an artificial creation entirely depend-
ent on the state for its powers gradually gave way to the view that corporations are the natural prod-
ucts of individual initiative and possess powers conferred by their constituent shareholders”); Susanna 
K. Ripken, Corporations Are People Too: A Multi-Dimensional Approach to the Corporate Person-
hood Puzzle, 15 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 97, 112–13 (2009) (describing the real entity theory). 
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This is often a pro-forma process; although states previously approved 
both municipal and business corporate charters on a case-by-case basis, ap-
proval is now typically automatic if certain minimal boxes are checked. Busi-
ness and charitable corporations are formed when a group of incorporators de-
cide on a name (within restrictions provided by the state),182 write and sign 
articles of organization, and file the articles with a state, along with a fee.183 In 
the case of many municipal corporations, residents of a particular area—
typically by majority vote—form a chartered municipality as permitted by 
state statute or the state constitution.184 
One could view municipal corporations, which have both a public and 
private corporate status, as possessing more bottom-up authority than certain 
other types of corporations. Even John Dillon recognized the relatively strong, 
independent roots of cities despite advocating for a narrower recognition of 
their power.185 Indeed, in 1871, two state judges argued for a doctrine of local 
government power that would recognize an organic, independent governance 
status for municipalities—one that would not paint municipalities as dependent 
on states for their authority. In Le Roy v. Hurlbut, the Supreme Court of Michi-
gan addressed a statute that empowered the state legislature to establish the 
procedures by which local governments should elect members of local boards, 
such as water commissions and sewer commissions.186 The legislature used 
this provision to directly appoint individual members of Detroit’s sewer and 
water commissions, and the Michigan Supreme Court deemed this to be an 
invalid assertion of state power.187 Justice Campbell noted that “[i]ncorporated 
cities and boroughs have always, both in England and in America, been self-
                                                                                                                           
 182 See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 156D, § 4.01 (2019) (providing that corporate names “shall 
contain the word ‘corporation,’ ‘incorporated,’ ‘company,’ or ‘limited’ or the abbreviation ‘corp.,’ 
‘inc.,’ or ‘ltd.,’ or words or abbreviations of like import in another language,” among other require-
ments). 
 183 See, e.g., id. § 2.03 (providing that “[c]orporate existence begins when the articles of organi-
zation become effective” and that “[t]he filing of the articles of organization with the state secretary 
shall be conclusive evidence that the incorporators satisfied all conditions precedent to incorporation 
and that the corporation has been incorporated under this chapter”). 
 184 See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 43, § 2 (2019) (“Any city, except Boston, which shall adopt, 
in the manner hereinafter prescribed, one of the plans of government provided in this chapter shall 
thereafter be governed by the provisions thereof . . . .”); EUGENE MCQUILLIN, A TREATISE ON THE 
LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS 300–02 (1st ed. 1911) (noting that municipal charters were pre-
viously granted individually through special legislation but that states now have general incorporation 
laws through which municipalities may choose to establish a charter). 
 185 DILLON, supra note 151, at 2, 16–22, 26–27 (noting that cities were independent sovereigns in 
Greece, that they amassed great power in England, although those powers were temporarily reined in 
by King Charles I and II, and that early local governments in the United States had many powers and 
were deemed to be important self-governing entities despite obtaining their powers from the states). 
 186 24 Mich. 44, 45 (1871). 
 187 Id. 
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governing communities within such scope of jurisdiction as their charters vest 
in the corporate body”188 and “[o]ur constitution cannot be understood or car-
ried out at all, except on the theory of local self-government.”189 
Even more powerfully, Justice Cooley argued that local governments 
might have as much, or even more, power than the states, suggesting that we 
might just as easily assume that “states have received delegations of power 
from independent towns,” rather than the dominant theory of local govern-
ments beholden to states.190 He noted that local governments were often 
formed before or alongside states, and that “[o]ur traditions, practice and expec-
tations have all been in one direction” of independent local self-governance.191 
Eugene McQuillin, writer of the Law of Municipal Corporations, later echoed 
this point, arguing that municipal control is “not a mere privilege, conferred by 
the central authority” but rather arises from fundamental principles of  local 
control.192 
Dillon’s conflicting, more limited theory of local government power won 
the day in most respects; however, the accounts of Justice Campbell, Justice 
Cooley, and McQuillin highlight facts that are often lost in the modern-day 
assumption that local governments are mere arms of the state.193 And some 
modern opinions arguably recognize relatively broad local powers, albeit not 
vis-à-vis states. The strongest Supreme Court doctrine recognizing generally 
strong rights of local governments (but not constitutional rights) is in the land 
use context. In Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., the Supreme Court de-
fended a local government’s decision to classify one property owner’s property 
                                                                                                                           
 188 Id. at 88. 
 189 Id. at 90. 
 190 Id. at 100. 
 191 Id. at 102–03. 
 192 MCQUILLIN, supra note 184, at 156. Indeed, in provinces such as New Hampshire—previously 
part of the Massachusetts Bay Colony—several settlements declared themselves to be self-governed 
territories prior to the formation of the colony or province. See, e.g., Thomas Linzey & Daniel E. 
Brannen Jr., A Phoenix from the Ashes: Resurrecting a Constitutional Right of Local, Community Self-
Government in the Name of Environmental Sustainability, 8 ARIZ. J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 1, 10 (2017) 
(noting compacts in places that were to become Portsmouth, Dover, and Exeter, New Hampshire da-
ting back to the 1620s and 30s). 
 193 See Frug, supra note 136, at 1114 (noting the “Cooley-Eaton-McQuillin thesis,” to which 
“[h]istory has not been kind”). As Frug notes, Eaton, too, argued that cities’ “‘right to local self-
government’ existed prior to state incorporations.” Id. at 1113 (quoting Amasa Eaton, The Right to 
Local Self-Government (pts. 1–3), 13 HARV. L. REV. 441, 570, 638 (1900); (pts. 4–5), 14 HARV. L. 
REV. 20, 116 (1901)). But see Richard C. Schragger, Reclaiming the Canvassing Board: Bush v. Gore 
and the Political Currency of Local Government, 50 BUFF. L. REV. 393, 408 (2002) [hereinafter 
Schragger, Reclaiming the Canvassing Board] (describing the “shadow doctrine” of local government 
law—a “quasi-constitutional doctrine of local sovereignty” that “finds expression in a number of cases 
involving the primary powers of local governments to regulate land use, control local finances, and 
administer local public schools”). 
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into three different zoning districts—two of which prohibited industrial devel-
opment—despite the property being near other industrial areas.194 According to 
generous readings of the case, the Court in Euclid and other cases recognized 
the “primary powers of local governments to regulate land use.”195 Richard 
Schragger views the Court in other cases as also having recognized local au-
thority to “control local finances, and administer local public schools.”196 In-
deed, in the realm of finances, the Court has specifically noted that when the 
federal government has shown an intention to give funds directly to local gov-
ernments, the state may not then appropriate those funds.197 
In one other indication that municipalities cannot be differentiated from 
other corporations simply because they depend on states for their governmen-
tal powers, a municipality’s subordinate status alone is sometimes not enough 
to protect a state’s decision to curtail the rights of a municipality. For example, 
in Gomillion v. Lightfoot, the Court addressed Alabama’s attempt to redraw the 
boundaries of the City of Tuskegee to disenfranchise black voters.198 The Court 
noted that the state had failed to provide any reason for its action other than 
racial discrimination.199 The Court explicitly rejected as a legitimate justifica-
tion the state’s municipal subordination argument—the argument that Alabama 
had simply redefined Tuskegee’s boundaries because it had the power to do 
so.200 The Court acknowledged Hunter v. City of Pittsburgh, Trustees of Dart-
mouth College v. Woodward, and similar cases, under which municipalities, as 
mere arms of the state, have no protection under the Contract or Due Process 
clauses.201 But the Court asserted that the state’s supposed ability to unilateral-
ly revoke municipal creation and municipal powers without running afoul of 
                                                                                                                           
 194 See 272 U.S. 365, 379 (1926) (describing how the east and west portions of the property were 
bounded by residential areas, but the property was also abutted by a railroad and industrial develop-
ment). 
 195 Schragger, Reclaiming the Canvassing Board, supra note 193, at 408. 
 196 Id.; see also Carol M. Rose, The Ancient Constitution vs. The Federalist Empire: Anti-
Federalism from the Attack on “Monarchism” to Modern Localism, 84 NW. U. L. REV. 74, 99 (1989) 
(noting that Euclid restored the local control stripped by Dillon’s Rule, and that local governments’ 
land use powers stripped away by the states’ “Quiet Revolution” in land use were similarly “redomi-
nated by local governments”). 
 197 Lawrence Cty. v. Lead-Deadwood Sch. Dist. No. 40-1, 469 U.S. 256, 263, 265 (1985) (“Con-
gress was not merely concerned that local governments receive adequate amounts of money, and that 
they receive these amounts directly. Equally important was the objective of ensuring local govern-
ments the freedom and flexibility to spend the federal money as they saw fit.”) (rejecting a state’s 
attempt to direct how a county could use federal funds distributed under the Payment in Lieu of Taxes 
Act). 
 198 See 364 U.S. 339 (1960). 
 199 Id. at 342. 
 200 Id. at 344–45. 
 201 Id. at 342–44; Hunter v. City of Pittsburgh, 207 U.S. 161 (1907); Trs. of Dartmouth Coll. v. 
Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819). 
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the Contract or Due Process clauses (doctrines which the Court also questioned 
at the time of the decision) did not insulate the state from its specific Fifteenth 
Amendment obligations.202 Thus, Alabama’s “generalities expressing the 
State’s unrestricted power—unlimited, that is, by the United States Constitu-
tion—to establish, destroy, or reorganize by contraction or expansion its politi-
cal subdivisions, to wit, cities, counties, and other local units” failed to per-
suade the Court in Gomillion that Alabama could redraw the City of Tuskeg-
ee’s boundaries at will.203 
In short, all corporations, whether public, private, or a combination of the 
two, rely to some extent on a higher government to grant them power, but this 
does not strip them of a unique, somewhat independent status. As Dillon him-
self noted, “Like other corporations, municipal corporations must . . . be creat-
ed by statute. They possess no powers or faculties not conferred upon them, 
either expressly or by fair implication, by the law which creates them or by 
other statutes applicable to them.”204 
F. Private or Public 
Many courts view municipal corporations as different—and refuse to 
grant them certain rights afforded to other corporations—by emphasizing that 
municipal corporations are not just subordinate to the state but are also public 
entities.205 This distinction follows a long line of earlier state and federal cases 
that, particularly in the nineteenth century, focused closely on the differences 
between public and private corporations and emphasized local governments’ 
reliance on states for their power.206 
The reasoning is that a higher governmental entity must recognize the 
municipal charter, as with any corporation, but the municipality itself is also a 
                                                                                                                           
 202 Gomillion, 364 U.S. at 342–43. 
 203 Id. at 342. 
 204 DILLON, supra note 151, at 61 (emphasis added). Dillon further emphasized this point, stating 
that “all corporations, public and private, exist and can exist only by virtue of express legislative en-
actment . . . .” Id. at 88. Dillon did, however, agree with the legal principle alive at that time, which 
was that private corporations possessed charters that constituted contracts, whereas municipal charters 
were not contracts. But he noted that, “vested rights in favor of third persons, if not indeed in favor of 
the corporation or rather the community which is incorporated, may arise under” a municipal charter. 
Id. at 142. 
 205 See Ysursa v. Pocatello Educ. Ass’n, 555 U.S. 353, 363 (2009) (referring to the municipality 
as a “public employer”). 
 206 See DILLON, supra note 151, at 142 (distinguishing between public and private corporations 
and noting that for private corporations, “when assented to, the legislative grant is irrevocable, and it 
cannot, without the consent of the corporation, be impaired or destroyed by any subsequent act of 
legislation”); Frug, supra note 136, at 1061 (“[T]he nineteenth century distinction between public and 
private corporations . . . created the radically different modern status for cities and for private corpora-
tions.”). 
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public arm or subcomponent of that higher governmental entity, and this 
makes the municipal corporation different. In Ysursa v. Pocatello Education 
Association, the Supreme Court—deeming municipal corporations to have no 
constitutional rights—zeroed in closely on this status, reasoning: 
A private corporation is subject to the government’s legal authority 
to regulate its conduct. A political subdivision, on the other hand, is 
a subordinate unit of government created by the State to carry out 
delegated governmental functions. A private corporation enjoys con-
stitutional protections, but a political subdivision, “created by a state 
for the better ordering of government, has no privileges or immuni-
ties under the federal constitution which it may invoke in opposition 
to the will of its creator.”207 
This reasoning follows, in part, the early principle set forth in dicta by the Su-
preme Court in Dartmouth College, which similarly made a stark distinction 
between public and private corporations due to the former’s reliance on a grant 
of political as opposed to private power.208 The Court determined that although 
revocation of private corporations’ charters could run afoul of the Contract 
Clause, for municipal corporations the “legislature of the State may act accord-
ing to its own judgment, unrestrained by any limitation of its power imposed 
by the constitution of the United States.”209 
Some scholars have rejected this public-private distinction. For instance, 
Roderick Hills argues that traditional corporations are just as constrained in 
their powers as municipalities, observing: 
[S]tate legislatures have traditionally exercised broad regulatory 
powers over private business corporations, controlling and some-
times even abolishing their economic activities. The business corpo-
ration today only has the power to initiate policies that have not 
been outlawed by the state. This power is precisely what municipal 
corporations have.210 
Indeed, numerous corporations have a complex public-private status—
one that has existed since the earliest corporations were formed.211 As Christo-
                                                                                                                           
 207 555 U.S. at 363 (quoting Williams v. Mayor of Baltimore, 289 U.S. 36 (1933)). 
 208 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 629–30. 
 209 Id. at 630. 
 210 Hills, supra note 38, at 2019. 
 211 Blair, supra note 143, at 787–88 & n.15 (quoting Andrew Lamont Creighton, The Emergence 
of Incorporation as a Legal Form for Organizations 34 (1990) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Stan-
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pher Stone observes, there are corporations that compete in the marketplace 
but largely depend on “government licenses and other privileges”; federally-
chartered corporations whose members are not government employees; private 
corporations whose officers and directors are selected by public agencies after 
a securities-based settlement; private corporations that provide “traditional 
public services” like judging; and “public” municipal corporations that con-
tract with private entities to provide traditional public services like police and 
fire protection.212 
Relatedly, municipalities themselves have a complex mixture of public 
and private functions embedded within their structure, as evidenced by the ex-
ceedingly complex law of municipal tort liability. In nineteenth-century U.S. 
law, municipalities were immune from liability when acting in their “public” 
sovereign capacity. But like any other private corporation, they were liable un-
der tort law when acting in a proprietary manner—providing services similar 
to other private corporations or otherwise carrying out “private” functions, 
such as functions that were specified in their corporate charter approved by the 
state.213 State statutes governing municipal liability and court decisions, to 
some extent, still apply this proprietary/government test for municipal conduct 
and associated municipal liability.214 
The argument that municipal corporations lack the protections of other 
corporations because they are governmental entities also fails to recognize the 
dual nature of municipalities, which, as the proprietary/government test 
acknowledges, are both governments and more traditional corporate service 
providers.215 In many respects, municipalities do exactly what traditional cor-
                                                                                                                           
considered quasi-public entities. See, e.g., Bedminster Hills Hous. Corp. v. Timberbrooke at Bedmin-
ster Condo. Ass’n, 2008 WL 631299, at *1 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Mar. 11, 2008) (noting a quasi-
public housing corporation). 
 212 Stone, supra note 77, at 1445–47. 
 213 See, e.g., Jones v. New Haven, 34 Conn. 1, 14 (1867) (finding that when a municipal corpora-
tion receives a charter from the state and agrees to certain conditions as part of that charter, the munic-
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 214 See, e.g., Hillerby v. Colchester, 167 Vt. 270, 272 (1997) (noting that “[t]his Court has applied 
the governmental/proprietary distinction for decades” and providing examples, such as a case finding 
that a municipal housing project was a proprietary activity subject to potential tort liability, whereas 
construction of a public playground was not). But see id. (acknowledging that only a minority of states 
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 215 Cf. Frug, supra note 136, at 1066 (arguing that “the historical connection between public and 
private corporations has been forgotten in favor of an automatic incantation of the distinction between 
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porations do, with the important caveat that they additionally tax residents and 
wield governmental power over those residents—activities that are clearly be-
yond the ambit of the traditional corporation. As Robert Ellickson notes, the 
Arizona Constitution expressly allows municipal corporations to “engage in 
industrial pursuits,”216 and in many states they act as businesses, owning and 
operating retail stores and housing stadiums, for example.217 This dual function 
is explored more fully in Part III below.218 
Considered together, the many characteristics of corporate status quite 
easily define both a traditional corporation and the municipal corporation. And 
the distinctions most commonly emphasized in differentiating municipal cor-
porations from others—their subordinate, public status—are not in fact as clear 
cut as typically portrayed. Indeed, with the rise of a broader range of corpora-
tion types, such as public benefit corporations that must stay true to a stated 
public purpose and quasi-public entities like housing corporations, the public-
private line is increasingly obfuscated. 
III. THE PURPOSE AND ROLE OF CORPORATIONS 
Municipalities are “corporations” well beyond the formalistic definitional 
groupings explored in Part I. Indeed, municipalities fit quite well within vari-
ous theories and doctrine defining the purpose and role of the corporation, in 
some cases more comfortably than other types of corporations that enjoy more 
corporate rights. Court cases giving certain rights to corporations have tended 
to follow one or more of these theories, often picking and choosing aspects of 
several theories in describing the importance of corporations and their need for 
rights. 
This Part explores the current essential roles of cities—building from a 
growing body of scholarship that emphasizes the importance of cities and the 
dearth of power possessed by cities.219 It then explores several of the dominant 
judicial theories for corporate rights, and how these justifications for giving 
rights to traditional corporations apply with equal or more force to cities and 
the modern demands that cities face.220 
A. Cities’ Essential Modern Functions 
Modern cities are essential political and economic actors. At their most 
basic level, cities’ importance as governing bodies rivals that of states and the 
                                                                                                                           
 216 Ellickson, supra note 63, at 1571 (quoting ARIZ. CONST. art. 2, § 34). 
 217 Id. at 1570–71. 
 218 See discussion infra Part III. 
 219 See discussion infra Part III.A. 
 220 See discussion infra Part III.B. 
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federal government on a variety of levels. As of the last census count, there 
were 38,910 counties, municipalities, and townships in the United States.221 
But cities are not merely governments. Economically, cities provide direct ser-
vices to residents, run more traditional businesses, and host an enormous pro-
portion of U.S. economic growth. On the political front, cities not only respond 
to residents’ demands for local change but also take important positions on the 
national and international stage—representing some residents’ views, acting as 
policy advocates in their own right, and by forming and maintaining a particu-
lar city brand or ethos. 
1. Cities as Economic Actors 
Perhaps more so than is typically recognized, cities independently engage 
in business, displacing private actors that would have otherwise provided the 
same good or service. Many local governments provide the services and goods 
to which the most basic of human rights attach—education, drinking water, 
waste removal and sewage service, and, in some cases, electricity and other 
basic energy needs. In many states, investor-owned utilities provide these ser-
vices in certain geographic areas, but some municipalities choose to provide 
them within their jurisdiction.222 Municipalities do this for a variety of reasons, 
such as providing greener or more socially responsible power at the request of 
their citizens223 or ensuring consumer protection.224 In their role as providers 
of essential services, local governments collectively spend nearly as much as 
the states in terms of expenditures such as welfare, health, housing and com-
munity development, education, libraries, police and fire protection, parks, and 
                                                                                                                           
 221 See CARMA HOGUE, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, GOVERNMENT ORGANIZATION SUMMARY RE-
PORT: 2012, at 1 (Sept. 26, 2013), https://www.census.gov/content/dam/Census/library/publications/
2013/econ/g12-cg-org.pdf [https://perma.cc/58R8-NRQB]. Not all of these, however, were incorpo-
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16,360 townships”). 
 222 See, e.g., Differences Between Publicly and Investor-Owned Utilities, CAL. ENERGY COMM’N, 
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Welton, supra note 165, at 338–41 (describing the reasons for municipalization). 
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highways;225 in 2012, state governments spent a total of $1.98 billion on all 
public services, and local governments spent $1.66 billion.226 
With more people now choosing cities as their home, and with increasing-
ly tight federal and state budgets, cities are expected to pick up the slack in 
terms of service and infrastructure provision, providing a growing suite of es-
sential services to residents despite struggling to balance their own budgets. 
For example, under federal environmental law cities must build wastewater 
treatment plants for sewage and industrial waste to meet federal standards, yet 
federal funding for these plants has declined.227 Many cities also provide 
drinking water—which must comply with a different set of federal standards—
without adequate funding from states or the federal government.228 As the 
2014 Flint, Michigan crisis demonstrates, when bankrupt cities attempt to ful-
fill their duty to provide basic human needs like water, disaster can result.229 In 
the case of Flint, thousands of children were permanently damaged by lead in 
their drinking water.230 States, in turn, require cities and other local govern-
ments to provide and operate everything from new voting machines to courts 
and jails, often without providing these governments with adequate funding for 
these immense tasks.231 Beyond these direct public services, cities participate 
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COST-DRIVERS NOT ADDRESSED BY LOWER REVENUE CAPS, https://county.org/Legislative/
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Revenue%20Caps.pdf [https://perma.cc/4J6D-JHGG] (citing courts, jails, indigent defense, and adult 
and juvenile probation as significant unfunded mandates for counties); Rachel Charlip, Unfunded 
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were expenditures related to state requirements such as new voting machines, jails, and “a new office 
for the commonwealth’s attorney”). 
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in a variety of other economic activity, both engaging in business and encour-
aging economic growth. 
Although several commentators focus on cities’ inability to act like tradi-
tional corporations, Robert Ellickson disagrees, noting that in many states, lo-
cal governments “develop housing complexes, retail stores, office buildings, 
sports stadiums, and redevelopment projects”; they also “rent tools; own and 
operate distant vacation resorts; sell retail products such as gasoline, liquor, 
light bulbs, and sportswear; and lend money to home-buyers and business en-
terprises.”232 
In addition to being important economic players, cities are critical in their 
role as hosts to the bulk of economic growth that occurs within the United 
States. Not only do two of the largest U.S. cities rank within the top twenty 
economies in the world,233 but many cities outrank their states on several eco-
nomic metrics. As Richard Schragger notes, “Phoenix generates 70% of Arizo-
na’s total economic output and 71% of the state’s employment.”234 Traditional-
ly, the literature describes cities as entities competing to attract growth, but 
several leading local government scholars take a different view. For example, 
Schragger argues that although cities host the bulk of U.S. economic growth, 
cities are not “merely vessels to be filled with desirable people or invest-
ments.”235 Many cities that have living wage laws—laws that go against the 
assumption that cities consistently compete for business by offering low taxes 
and other business friendly policies—are also some of the most economically 
prosperous. In short, Schragger argues that “the relationship between economic 
prosperity and policy is not straightforward,” and thus, cities should—and in a 
surprising number of cases, do—feel free to implement policies that respond to 
the needs of interests beyond business; yet these cities might still experience 
strong economic growth.236 
Many cities still follow the traditional approach of offering tax breaks and 
other perks to corporations.237 But another strategy is more nuanced and relates 
to Schragger’s observation that the driving forces behind economic prosperity 
in cities are not clear cut. In some cases, cities are taking progressive political 
stances to respond to the demands of their electorate and bolster the national 
political aspirations of local officials, but they are doing so equipped with the 
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knowledge that forming and maintaining a particular city brand—including a 
political one—might attract certain types of residents and corporate wealth. 
Many corporate headquarters are moving to cities to attract young, tech-savvy 
employees.238 Although many cities enact progressive policies in response to 
non-business constituents, it is possible that some have recognized the connec-
tion between certain progressive policies and the likelihood that a highly 
sought after workforce might move to the city in part due to a preference for 
these policies. Whether cities’ policies are aimed directly at attracting business 
or are more nuanced, cities need rights proportionate to their roles as critical 
hosts of business and resident “foot shoppers.”239 When extensive preemption 
of laws like living wage ordinances and environmental regulations prevents 
cities from creating the type of physical and cultural atmosphere that they be-
lieve will attract residents and workers, they need rights to at least partially 
counteract this trend.240 
2. Cities’ Role as Political Representatives and Policy Advocates 
Cities are increasingly recognized not only as units competing to offer 
services to residents but also as important political players—both in terms of 
representing their residents and also acting as policy advocates on the national 
front. In this sense, too, they are like traditional for-profit corporations that 
respond to internal shareholder initiatives but also, increasingly, externally ad-
vocate for national or international policy without any prodding from share-
holders. 
In many respects, local governments are quintessentially representative 
“public governments”—even more so than their federal or state counterparts.241 
Internally speaking, cities exist only because their residents have elected that 
                                                                                                                           
 238 See Nelson D. Schwartz, Why Corporate America Is Leaving the Suburbs for the City, N.Y. 
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leadership, and one of their primary roles is to respond to citizens’ goals and 
concerns. Indeed, they are far more “representative,” in terms of the number of 
officials per represented person, than federal and state governments. In 1992—
the last time the U.S. Census reported this information—incorporated munici-
pal governments had 135,531 elected officials; counties had an additional 
58,818 officials.242 In total, elected local officials (including counties, munici-
palities, and “special districts” that provide water and other limited services) 
comprised 96.2 percent of all elected officials in the United States.243 Although 
this does not mean that local governments are, in fact, more responsive to indi-
viduals’ views than more numerically limited and distant state governments, 
statistics provide some optimism for the proposition that a higher ratio of rep-
resentatives to residents leads to better responsiveness. Residents contract their 
local representatives more than their state or federal ones, and they participate 
directly in local government through membership on boards.244 A recent politi-
cal science study of representation in 1,600 U.S. cities and towns concluded 
that “city governments are responsive to the views of their citizens across a 
wide range of policy areas,” and “the substantive impact of citizens’ prefer-
ences on policy outcomes is quite large.”245 
Local governments—not only as part of their representation of constitu-
ents but also a broader, outwardly focused mission—are also critical external 
players. In some cases, locally implemented policies simply have important 
collective impacts at the state, and even national level. For example, city bans 
on smoking were a substantial factor precipitating the rapid transition to large-
ly smoke-free spaces now enjoyed around the United States,246 despite states 
initially preempting these efforts.247 
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Beyond influencing broader policy through their own policy actions, cit-
ies act expressly as policy advocates. They regularly lobby and sue states 
(when they are allowed to)248 and the federal government, and they have in-
creasingly joined forces to impact national and international policy through 
lobbying and litigation. In recent examples, at the state level, Florida cities 
have sued to oppose state preemption of local gun control.249 Nationally, sixty 
local governments, along with eighteen states and the District of Columbia, 
intervened in support of the Obama administration’s Clean Power Plan, which 
was designed to curb U.S. greenhouse gas emissions.250 In 2005, cities and 
states successfully sued the Environmental Protection Agency for its failure to 
adequately justify its refusal to regulate greenhouse gases as a “pollutant” un-
der the Clean Air Act.251 In other national debates, such as immigration, more 
than 160 cities and counties have elected sanctuary city status, meaning that 
they will not assist the federal government in detaining and deporting immi-
grants.252 
As noted above, on the international front, hundreds of cities have joined 
states, businesses, and nonprofit groups to declare an ongoing commitment to 
the Paris Agreement, an international climate agreement.253 These are not emp-
ty promises. Some of the signatory cities are among the fifteen most populous 
in the United States, are substantial contributors to greenhouse gas emissions 
that cause climate change, and are now on a path to eliminate or substantially 
reduce greenhouse gas emissions. For example, Austin, Texas, which operates 
its own electric utility, has a city-wide goal of emitting net zero greenhouse 
gases by 2050.254 It is meeting this goal largely through energy efficiency and 
renewable energy initiatives, and based on current and planned projects, the 
city is “on track to produce fifty-five percent of its energy from renewable 
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sources by 2025.”255 In many cases, when cities act as policy advocates, they 
are only representing a subset of their “members”—the voters who agree with 
the position. Indeed, in some cases voters openly oppose cities’ outward stanc-
es. In Anderson v. City of Boston, a taxpayer resident sued Boston, Massachu-
setts when the city approved the use of local funds to support a state referen-
dum. The Supreme Judicial Court concluded that local governments in Massa-
chusetts could not, under state legislation, spend any money influencing politi-
cal campaigns such as state referenda.256 But the same representation issue is 
true of private corporations that take increasingly public stances, as previously 
discussed in Part II.257 
Cities thus play a central role in state and federal debates in addition to 
fostering local policies designed to benefit their residents. Cities need the lee-
way to provide the services their residents expect and that they are legally ob-
ligated to provide—that is to regulate in support of their residents’ welfare, 
attract businesses and the workforce on which these businesses rely, and enact 
policies that are both symbolic and substantive. Several scholars have focused, 
in particular, on the need for cities to act as local democracies—places in 
which citizens can achieve desired policies that are blocked by large interests, 
gridlock, and other impediments at the state and federal level. As Gerald Frug 
argues: 
Cities have served—and might again serve—as vehicles to achieve 
purposes which have been frustrated in modern American life. They 
could respond to what Hannah Arendt has called the need for “pub-
lic freedom”—the ability to participate actively in the basic societal 
decisions that affect one’s life.258 
Richard Schragger similarly argues for a “robust, democratically responsive, 
politically autonomous city” that can tackle issues well beyond economic 
growth.259 
In sum, cities need the power, and protections, to create economic and po-
litical environments that allow them to attract and retain residents, respond to 
resident preferences, and project residents’ and cities’ broader views into state, 
national, and international debates that affect their wellbeing. 
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B. Values Ascribed by Courts to Business Corporations 
Business corporations are like cities in many ways. Indeed, scholars have 
emphasized many of the commonalities. Roderick Hills asserts that private 
governments such as “churches, trade unions, for-profit corporations,” and the 
like are: 
“[G]overnments” in the obvious sense that they govern some part of 
the world—land . . . bank accounts, buildings, machinery . . . [b]ut 
[also] in the sharper sense that, because they control these resources, 
they have the power to influence or . . . “coerce” individuals by 
withholding the resources they control.260 
Political scientist David Ciepley argues that governments—indeed, even 
the U.S. government—are modeled directly on corporate charters, noting how 
“[t]he earliest American colonies were literal corporations of the Crown.”261 
Similarly, Earl Latham notes that “the First Charter of Massachusetts . . . creat-
ed ‘one body corporate and politique in fact and name,’” and that the early 
Virginia Charters similarly granted business corporations—those that owned 
land and private resources—governmental powers as well, including the 
“management of military forces and the coinage of money.”262 
Hills also notes critical differences that make some corporations “pri-
vate,” as opposed to “municipal,” including, for example, the fact that munici-
pal corporations “have involuntary citizens when they are first incorporated . . . 
and their customers and constituents . . . cannot escape municipal jurisdiction 
without changing their place of residence.”263 These and other differences are 
important, as explored here, but this Section also focuses on the meaningful 
commonalities between the institutional purposes of business and municipal 
corporations, as well as the functional aspects of constitutional rights that can 
be furthered when these corporations are given such rights.264 
1. Identity-Neutral Rights Bearers 
In the courts, a prominent purpose linked to corporations is their ability to 
represent members’ views. This lauded purpose takes two forms also found in 
                                                                                                                           
 260 Hills, supra note 37, at 149–50. 
 261 David Ciepley, Is the U.S. Government a Corporation? The Corporate Origins of Modern 
Constitutionalism, 111 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 418, 418 (2017). 
 262 Earl Latham, The Body Politic of the Corporation, in THE CORPORATION IN MODERN SOCIE-
TY, supra note 134, at 218, 221 (quoting WILLIAM MCDONALD, DOCUMENTARY SOURCE BOOK OF 
AMERICAN HISTORY 22 (1928)). 
 263 Hills, supra note 37, at 151. 
 264 See discussion infra Part III.B. 
2020] Rethinking Municipal Corporate Rights 641 
the literature on speech rights. In his article theorizing the importance of group 
speech rights—and particularly governments’ right to speak—Meir Dan-Cohen 
identified two primary forms of speech: “active” speech, representing individ-
uals’ autonomy and their right to speak, and “passive” speech rights associated 
with listeners’ autonomy and their freedom to be exposed to and select from a 
range of views.265 The right of listeners to be exposed to speech and ideas has 
been particularly prominent in the corporate rights cases, which de-emphasize 
the identity of the speaker and emphasize the importance of speech being pro-
jected and available to all.266 
As David Fagundes has noted, the very text of the First Amendment is 
“object neutral” in that it protects the “freedom of speech” and does not “speci-
fy the entities on which” it “confers rights.”267 The recent Supreme Court cases 
strengthening corporate rights similarly assert that for certain constitutional 
rights, the identity of the rights bearer is irrelevant. Rather, the corporation, as 
rights bearer, merely has the beneficial purpose of contributing to a larger soci-
etal cause, such as contributing to the marketplace of ideas. This Subsection 
explorers the identity-neutral aspect of this argument, and Subsection 2 de-
scribes the Court’s focus on the broader societal purposes of the corporate 
rights it has identified.268 Subsection 3 follows by exploring corporations’ abil-
ity to represent the individual views of their members and amplify these views 
on a broader stage—a purpose associated with Meir Dan-Cohen’s “active 
speech” rights.269 
In 1979, in First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, the U.S. Supreme 
Court expressed a principle that laid the foundation for later corporate rights 
decisions. The Court emphasized that a First Amendment analysis should not 
concern itself with the question of whether corporations—who happened to be 
challenging the law—“have First Amendment rights and, if so, whether they 
are coextensive with those of natural persons.”270 In other words, whether the 
speaker happened to be an individual or a group of individuals who had band-
ed together in the form of a “corporation” did not matter; the relevant inquiry 
was whether protected First Amendment speech had been violated.271 The 
Court in Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission solidified and further 
emphasized this principle, observing: “The identity of the speaker is not deci-
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sive in determining whether speech is protected. Corporations and other asso-
ciations, like individuals, contribute to the ‘discussion, debate, and the dissem-
ination of information and ideas’ that the First Amendment seeks to foster.”272 
Just as certain legal protections extend to all entities, the Court has also 
gone to great pains to emphasize that the type of corporation does not matter 
from the perspective of vindicating certain rights, as shown by the Citizens 
United mention of “corporations and other associations.”273 In Burwell v. 
Hobby Lobby Stores, in which the closely-held corporation Hobby Lobby was 
deemed to be a “person” protected by the Religious Freedom Restoration Act 
(RFRA), the Court stated: “No known understanding of the term ‘person’ in-
cludes some but not all corporations,” and “no conceivable definition of the 
term includes natural persons and nonprofit corporations, but not for-profit 
corporations.”274 Further highlighting the many forms and types of entities pro-
tected as persons under the Act, the Court in Hobby Lobby noted that “[e]ach 
American jurisdiction today either expressly or by implication authorizes cor-
porations to be formed under its general corporation act for any lawful purpose 
or business.”275 
In responding to various arguments of the government and dissent for 
why certain types of corporations should not be able to assert religious beliefs, 
the Supreme Court in Hobby Lobby did focus on the fact that the corporation 
seeking shelter under RFRA was a “closely-held corporation.”276 Indeed, the 
holding only applies to this type of corporation, although much of the Court’s 
language emphasizes in great detail the importance of treating all corporations 
equally from the perspective of personhood. 
The reasoning in Bellotti, Citizens United, and Hobby Lobby does not 
seem to provide any exceptions to the identity-neutral preference of the Court 
in the context of the First Amendment and RFRA. Read more broadly, it sug-
gests that municipal corporations should not be excluded from these types of 
rights merely because they have a different corporate label. 
Municipal corporations are formed, in part, for a different purpose than 
traditional corporations. Like many traditional corporations, municipalities 
provide various services and goods to residents and charge them accordingly, 
but unlike traditional corporations, they also wield governmental authority 
over residents to reduce conflicts among land uses and protect public health, 
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safety, and welfare in other ways. But the Court has expressly noted that the 
purpose of a particular corporation is irrelevant; a corporation is a corpora-
tion.277 Further, it should not matter that municipal corporations exist only at 
the whim of the state and that their powers can be stripped away by the state. 
The Court in Citizens United recognized that states are the creators of all forms 
of corporation.278 Indeed, traditional corporations, too, exist only because the 
state allows them to and are subject to ongoing oversight by the state regarding 
their structure and operation.279 
Citizens United and Hobby Lobby thus further buttress a view that a Har-
vard Law Review Note expressed in 1980—that “[t]he Court’s reasoning in . . . 
Bellotti could be used to support a constitutional argument that the first amend-
ment protects municipal speech.”280 Indeed, these two more recent cases, with 
their insistent inclusion of corporations, and all forms of corporations, within 
certain protected legal spheres, seem to strongly support this conclusion.281 
The argument for ignoring the identity of the entity seeking a right is not 
bulletproof—or perhaps even sound. As the dissent in Citizens United correctly 
noted, the Court has held “in a variety of contexts . . . that speech can be regu-
lated differentially on account of the speaker’s identity” if justified by a legiti-
mate governmental interest.282 And with respect to speech relating to elections, 
the identity of the speaker can matter substantially due to concerns about dis-
tortion and corruption—concerns recently highlighted by growing evidence 
that Russia used social media and other means to influence the outcome of the 
last U.S. presidential election.283 But despite the serious flaws in the identity-
neutral argument for protecting corporate speech, while the law stands there 
are few reasons for refusing to extend it to municipalities. Indeed, municipali-
ties might serve as an important countervailing force to some of the distortion 
and corruption that could arise from rampant corporate speech. 
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2. Bearers of Rights That Benefit Society 
Deeply intertwined with the identity-neutral argument is the Court’s focus 
on certain constitutional rights that are primarily designed to broadly protect 
and benefit society at large, not just individuals.284 As the Court has stated, 
“[t]he Constitution often protects interests broader than those of the party seek-
ing their vindication.”285 And corporations, in the Court’s view, are excellent 
bearers of these sorts of rights. 
The First Amendment is a classic example; it is largely viewed as safe-
guarding the right of all to have access to a broad and diverse marketplace of 
ideas, and thus as an essential measure for protecting the vibrancy of our dem-
ocratic state.286 In Citizens United, the Court alluded to this broader im-
portance, noting that with censorship of certain views, “the electorate [has 
been] deprived of information, knowledge and opinion vital to its function.”287 
This relates directly to the Court’s view—described in Subsection 1 of this 
Section—that the identity of the entity asserting a right is inoperative in some 
contexts. 
Under this “societal benefit” or “object neutral” approach to a right, the 
Court asks whether a particular law impermissibly impedes a constitutional 
right, and, if it does, the law must fall. For example, in Bellotti, which rejected 
the identity of the speaker as being important to First Amendment analysis, the 
Court noted that certain constitutional protections like the First Amendment 
are largely designed to serve “significant societal interests,” and that therefore 
the proper question is whether a particular law abrogates “expression that the 
First Amendment was meant to protect.”288 In a limited number of cases, 
courts have recognized municipalities’ ability, in particular, to foster this sort 
of public-benefiting expression. A California court has concluded that govern-
ments, including municipalities, should have certain First Amendment protec-
tions because “if the unfettered interchange of ideas is a central concern of the 
First Amendment,” protecting government speech from certain defamation 
claims “is entirely consistent with First Amendment dogma, in that it promotes 
government’s contribution to the marketplace of ideas.”289 And while stopping 
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short of recognizing that governments are protected by the First Amendment, 
the D.C. Circuit has noted in a footnote that a government (in that case, a fed-
eral agency) may at times “participate in the marketplace of ideas or contribute 
its own views to those of other speakers.”290 
Beyond the First Amendment, many statutory and constitutional rights 
have a similarly broad purpose—albeit perhaps a secondary purpose to protect-
ing individual liberties. Thus, although rights such as Equal Protection are 
rooted in preventing discrimination against individuals and specific groups, 
their purpose extends to fostering a more just society in which no one lives 
with the fear of being singled out for an unconstitutional reason. 
Cities, perhaps more so than for-profit corporations, are well positioned to 
exercise rights that have a broader public purpose. They often promulgate or-
dinances designed to further protect or expand the individual rights guaranteed 
by the federal constitution, in part as a symbolic move to signal a preference 
for a more open and welcoming community. In taking these steps, cities have 
in some cases been at the forefront of national moves to garner federal consti-
tutional protection for previously unrecognized groups. For example, Aspen, 
Boulder, and Denver, Colorado prohibited discrimination against individuals 
based on sexual orientation,291 and a diverse set of cities or individual city offi-
cials in both blue and red states issued marriage licenses to same-sex cou-
ples,292 well before states legalized same-sex marriage and the Supreme Court 
constitutionalized the right in Obergefell v. Hodges.293 
3. Representatives of Members 
Under a theory that is somewhat counter to the identity-neutral and pub-
lic-focused arguments, the Supreme Court and scholars in certain camps have 
also identified corporations as important conduits for individual members’ 
views. Indeed, corporations can collect views and preferences of individuals 
and work to vindicate these views and preferences through internal govern-
ance. A corporation’s representation of members’ views can also extend exter-
nally, in that the corporation can convey those views to the external world. 
The virtue of representation varies in tone across different corporate theo-
ries introduced above, which alternately argue that the corporation merely ex-
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ercises derivative rights of its members,294 or is itself a rights-wielding enti-
ty.295 If the corporation is merely derivative—an approach also described as the 
“aggregation theory” in corporate law296—the question of adequate representa-
tion is particularly important. 
The majority in Hobby Lobby, which extolled the representative aspect of 
corporations, seemed to take a firm derivative rights approach, asserting: 
A corporation is simply a form of organization used by human be-
ings to achieve desired ends. An established body of law specifies 
the rights and obligations of the people (including shareholders, of-
ficers, and employees) who are associated with a corporation in one 
way or another. When rights, whether constitutional or statutory, are 
extended to corporations, the purpose is to protect the rights of these 
people . . . . Corporations, “separate and apart from” the human be-
ings who own, run, and are employed by them, cannot do anything 
at all.297 
The majority therefore viewed corporations as essentially identical to their 
members, suggesting that when a corporation speaks or asserts beliefs, it is 
simply channeling the beliefs of its members. The Court in Citizens United 
seemed to take less of a derivative approach, viewing corporations as inde-
pendent entities that can speak. For example, in response to concerns by the 
dissent that corporations’ dissenting shareholders would be silenced by the 
holding, the majority noted that in First Amendment cases relating to the me-
dia, this would unreasonably silence a newspaper from speaking if its share-
holder disagreed with a particular political view of the newspaper.298 But at 
other points, the Court veered toward derivative rights, emphasizing the gravi-
ty of the “right of citizens” to speak when granting First Amendment protec-
tions to a corporation.299 Justice Scalia’s concurrence was even more clearly 
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within this camp; he asserted that the corporate representative “speaks on be-
half of the human beings who have formed that association.”300 
The Court in both cases, although taking more of a derivative approach in 
Hobby Lobby, also addressed or simply dismissed the concern that a corpora-
tion—assuming that to some extent it speaks for its members—could not ade-
quately represent all members’ views or beliefs given their diversity. The ma-
jority in Citizens United noted that there is little evidence of shareholder repre-
sentation abuse “that cannot be corrected by shareholders through the proce-
dures of corporate democracy.”301 The majority in Hobby Lobby similarly dis-
missed criticisms that large corporations with millions of distant and diverse 
shareholders could not hold beliefs or accurately represent those shareholders’ 
beliefs. In a somewhat weakly reasoned rebuttal, the majority assumed that 
most “corporate giants”302 simply would not raise RFRA claims due to practi-
cal difficulties in doing so, while also noting that the case only addressed 
closely-held corporations, which have means of resolving disputes among their 
members.303 
With respect to concerns about whether a corporation can adequately rep-
resent its members’ views or beliefs or be recognized as an independent “be-
lief-wielding” entity, the average resident within a municipal corporation—
even a resident within the political minority—is likely to feel better represent-
ed by her government than by the large corporations in which she holds 
stocks.304 Indeed, some municipalities even allow noncitizens and sixteen-
year-old residents to vote.305 Along these lines, some scholars argue that states’ 
curbs on local speech—for example, prohibitions on local governments’ deci-
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sions to remove old confederate monuments—inhibit individuals’ speech rights 
by blocking a message that the community has decided to support.306 
In both the municipal and traditional corporation, however, members of 
the corporations are not consistently directly represented; they rely on a high-
er-level entity to listen to and, potentially, vindicate their views. In the tradi-
tional corporate context, managers make the ultimate decisions, and “may act 
in a way that fails to maximize shareholder welfare.”307 Similarly, in a city, an 
elected council or commission votes and inevitably estranges minority constit-
uents opposed to that vote. But cities also offer robust opportunities for citizen 
initiatives and referenda, which involve direct democracy,308 and residents fre-
quently take advantage of these referenda, using them for issues like bans on 
hydraulic fracturing309 to sweeping measures that support environmental pro-
tection.310 Shareholders also have opportunities for proxy activism through 
federally regulated shareholder proposals, but the use and success rate for 
proxy activism appears to be more limited than in the municipal context, par-
ticularly because so many individuals invest through mutual funds and cannot 
take direct “action to influence corporate governance.”311 
Even large cities offer far more opportunities for input from their mem-
bers than do for-profit corporations, and residents in the political minority can 
likely better influence a campaign to oust the incumbent city council than an 
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effort to unseat corporate board members.312 That said, participation rates in 
local elections are abysmally low,313 so although municipalities offer opportu-
nities for relatively strong representation, residents do not consistently take 
advantage of these opportunities. 
Another representation-based concern raised by the dissent in Citizens 
United was that ignoring a speaker’s identity (including corporate identity) for 
the purposes of protecting political speech could allow the speaker to channel 
the views of members who should not receive equal footing with respect to 
speech rights. Specifically, the dissent was concerned that the majority’s Citi-
zens United approach means that “multinational corporations controlled by 
foreigners” have the same speech rights as “individual Americans.”314 Munici-
palities do not suffer from a similar problem, in that they generally only speak 
for the voting residents within their boundaries. That is not to say, of course, 
that municipal officials are immune from outside influence. And some states 
now allow municipalities to permit nonresidents to vote in limited municipal 
elections “such as bond and tax elections.”315 But the threat of municipalities 
speaking for or otherwise representing individuals who are not as deserving of 
U.S. legal rights seems more remote in the municipal context than in the “cor-
porate giant” sphere. 
Municipalities, which are arguably more representative of members’ 
views (at least, that is, the majority’s views) than other corporate forms, are 
also particularly good at raising these views beyond municipal limits, whether 
through lawsuits, international commitments coordinated with other cities, or 
other platforms external to the city itself. As the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Seventh Circuit has suggested, “[t]o the extent . . . that a municipality is the 
voice of its residents—is, indeed, a megaphone amplifying voices that might 
not otherwise be audible—a curtailment of its right to speak might be thought 
a curtailment of the unquestioned First Amendment rights of those resi-
dents.”316 The challenge here, of course, is determining when a city should act 
as a megaphone, if one focuses on the city acting derivatively for its members, 
rather than independently as an entity wishing to promote a certain brand to 
attract certain new residents and businesses. As David Fagundes notes, under 
the megaphone theory, if one views a corporation as exercising rights for its 
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members (the derivative approach), one would have to choose whether the cor-
poration should speak only when a simple majority of members agreed with the 
viewpoint, a near-unanimous majority agreed, or by some other metric—and 
identifying the degree of member agreement on each issue would be difficult.317 
Critics of extending corporate rights to cities are also likely to argue that a 
key public-private corporation distinction is that members of public corpora-
tions are not exactly members by consent; they become members simply by 
moving in—a decision often dictated primarily by economic and social needs 
and not by the person’s preference for the particular municipality. This is par-
ticularly problematic for political minorities whose voice is not well represent-
ed at the municipal level. But even individuals who become members of a cor-
poration by consent—as with shareholders in a publicly-held for-profit corpo-
ration—can find themselves in the minority, and often with fewer tools to ex-
press their objections than they would find within a municipal corporation. 
Under the “exit and voice” theory of influence, individuals wishing to change 
the policies of an organization of which they are a member can stay within that 
organization and attempt to express their concerns, or they can simply leave.318 
On this metric, private and municipal corporations are nearly equal; municipal-
ities arguably provide more opportunities for members to voice objections, 
whereas shareholders can arguably more easily exit a traditional corporation 
than a municipality.319 
With respect to voice, an annual shareholder meeting for a corporation 
with millions of shareholders is hardly an outlet for an individual with a paltry 
amount of stock. This is particularly the case compared to monthly or even 
weekly opportunities for a municipal resident to voice her concerns before a 
city council or a commission. Further, if “nonconsenting” residents of a munic-
ipal corporation have moved to a municipality solely for reasons of finding a 
job there or needing to be near family, these individuals are also “captive” 
members of the state and need a voice at the state level, too. If the “mega-
phone” theory of local speech is correct, and the municipality is able to ampli-
fy these individuals’ views in opposition to contrary state positions, this is an 
important outlet for captive residents.320 
Exit wise, shareholders might fare better than municipal residents. In 
many cases they can more easily pull their stock out of a corporation than pack 
up and move from a municipality. But even here, municipalities might some-
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times provide a stronger opportunity for expression. The millions of relatively 
unsophisticated stockholders who invest through mutual funds are limited to 
sending relatively messy signals through their exit actions; in other words, they 
will have difficulty pulling their investments out of specific companies within 
the fund whose policies are found objectionable. An average middle-class citi-
zen wishing to pull her investments out of any company associated with fossil 
fuel production or refining might realistically have to move all of her assets to 
a socially responsible mutual fund, potentially forgoing substantial yields as a 
result of this decision. 
4. Economically Powerful Speakers 
In another argument that focuses on the identity of the rights-holder, the 
Supreme Court has argued that it is important for even economically powerful 
corporations to have speech rights. The Court in Citizens United noted that 
“[c]orporations and other associations, like individuals, contribute to the ‘dis-
cussion, debate, and the dissemination of information and ideas’ that the First 
Amendment seeks to foster”321 and highlighted the danger of stifling the voices 
that “best represent the most significant segments of the economy.”322 If it is 
indeed important for the most powerful economic actors to contribute their 
voice to the marketplace of ideas, municipalities must have a seat at the table. 
Many scholars paint the early purpose of municipalities as being almost 
wholly an economic one.323 Indeed, the British municipal corporations to 
which U.S. municipalities owe their origins were decidedly economically fo-
cused.324 During the early colonial years, U.S. towns and cities similarly 
“devot[ed] the bulk of their legislative effort to promoting economic order and 
growth” and did not provide much in the way of other public services such as 
sewage or waste removal or health-promoting laws.325 Over time, local gov-
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ernments grew to be major providers of public services such as water, sewer, 
natural gas, and electricity, among other goods.326 
Modern cities host the bulk of economic activity in the United States. The 
New York metropolitan area alone is the world’s tenth largest economy, and 
Los Angeles is not far behind, ranking eighteenth.327 Under the Citizens United 
reasoning, cities—even more so than other actors—may need their voices 
heard in the political debate so that they can enact the types of policies essen-
tial to attracting, retaining, and fostering economic growth, without being 
broadly preempted.328 
Further, the majority in Citizens United specifically pointed to the im-
portance of corporations of all sizes and types communicating with the federal 
and state governments through lobbying and other means, observing: 
Corporate executives and employees counsel Members of Congress 
and Presidential administrations on many issues, as a matter of rou-
tine and often in private. An amici brief filed on behalf of Montana 
and 25 other States notes that lobbying and corporate communica-
tions with elected officials occur on a regular basis.329 
The Court emphasized that it would be dangerous to allow these types of 
communications for only certain types of corporations—such as large, for-
profit corporations, and to prohibit them for others, such as nonprofits. It ex-
pressed specific concerns about preventing corporations “including small and 
nonprofit corporations, from presenting both facts and opinions to the public,” 
noting the need for these types of corporations to “raise a voice to object when 
other corporations, including those with vast wealth, are cooperating with the 
Government.”330 
Like nonprofits and small corporations, many municipalities play an im-
portant role in providing diverse views that sometimes counter the views of 
large, for-profit corporations. For example, as noted above, sixty local gov-
ernments intervened in support of the Clean Power Plan that would have 
curbed U.S. greenhouse gas emissions, countering large coal companies and 
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some other corporations that opposed the plan.331 Although many municipali-
ties are themselves economic giants, as noted above, their interests extend far 
beyond profits, as evidenced by the fact that some of the cities with the largest 
economic “worth” have some of the most generous wage floor policies.332 
5. Rights Bearers with a Focus Beyond Profits 
On the flip side of the importance of economic interests, one emphasis of 
the majority in Hobby Lobby and Citizens United was that corporations can 
state important political opinions and wield beliefs because they are not merely 
focused on profit margins. This was in part in response to dissenting arguments 
that profit-motivated actors hold very different types of beliefs and ideas that 
do not merit protection in the speech-based or religious contexts of these cases. 
This dissenting focus had several components. First, the idea was that the sup-
posed “speech” or “beliefs” of a corporation might not relate at all to political 
or religious ideas, but rather money. And second, in the First Amendment con-
text, this problem was intertwined with the fact that wealthy corporations 
would have a disproportionate impact within the marketplace of ideas and 
would distort it. 
Expressing both of these concerns, the dissenting justices in Citizens 
United noted: 
The resources in the treasury of a business corporation . . . are not an 
indication of popular support for the corporation’s political ideas. 
They reflect instead the economically motivated decisions of inves-
tors and customers. The availability of these resources may make a 
corporation a formidable political presence, even though the power 
of the corporation may be no reflection of the power of its ideas. It 
might also be added that corporations have no consciences, no be-
liefs, no feelings, no thoughts, no desires.333 
The Hobby Lobby dissent similarly noted that “for-profit corporations are differ-
ent from religious non-profits in that they use labor to make a profit, rather than 
to perpetuate [the] religious value[s] [shared by a community of believers].”334 
The majority in both cases dismissed concerns that recognizing powerful 
economic corporations as persons with protected beliefs or speech was prob-
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lematic given corporations’ purpose of making money, or given their ability to 
use disproportionately large resources to distort debates. The Hobby Lobby 
majority offered the somewhat weak rebuttal that for-profit corporations often 
support charitable causes,335 and that organizations with a primarily charitable 
mission sometimes organize as for-profits for purposes other than making 
money, such as retaining the ability to lobby.336 And the majority in Citizens 
United argued that most for-profit corporations do not have “large amounts of 
wealth.”337 
Municipal corporations, more clearly than for-profit corporations, exist 
not only for practical purposes—such as attracting businesses and an adequate 
tax base to run their affairs—but also for clear publicly driven purposes unre-
lated to profits. As John Dillon noted, “[m]unicipal corporations are created 
and exist for the public advantage, and not for the benefit of their officers or of 
particular individuals or classes.”338 Indeed, the number of large cities that 
have chosen to enact aggressively redistributivist policies demonstrates the 
publicly oriented focus of many municipalities.339 So, too, do cities’ efforts to 
protect the rights of certain societal groups. For example, in Romer v. Evans, 
initiated by municipalities and individual gay and lesbian plaintiffs, the Court 
affirmed Colorado local governments’ efforts to protect these plaintiffs’ 
rights.340 And in Washington v. Seattle School District No. 1, Washington 
blocked a school district’s attempt to end “racial isolation” and cure a racial 
imbalance in school populations by reassigning students to different schools 
and busing them, among other measures.341 
The simple fact that much of the purpose of municipal corporations is to 
benefit the public should not, however, be extended too far to suggest that mu-
nicipal corporations should possess full First Amendment rights. As others 
have noted, governments—perhaps even more so than for-profit corpora-
tions—also have the dangerous ability to distort speech, although this is more 
of a threat at the federal level due to the breadth and resources of the federal 
government.342 
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With these caveats aside, if we are to follow the Court’s recent doctrine 
and reasoning with respect to recognizing corporate rights, cities might be a far 
better fit than other corporations—particularly for-profit entities—supported 
by the Court’s opinions. Post-Hobby Lobby and Citizens United, no courts 
have directly addressed whether the Supreme Court’s broad definition of cor-
porations and associations, and its extension of certain rights to these groups, 
applies to municipalities. But prior to these cases, at least one court has taken 
the approach for which this Article advocates. Speaking in the context of the 
First Amendment, the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York 
stated directly that “[a] municipal corporation, like any corporation, is protect-
ed under the First Amendment in the same manner as an individual.”343 
IV. OPERATIONALIZING AND JUSTIFYING MUNICIPAL CORPORATE RIGHTS 
Recognizing cities as corporations worthy of the rights assigned to other 
corporate forms will not likely provide cities with all of the powers that schol-
ars have persuasively argued they need, such as the power to raise adequate 
funds to provide essential services. For example, any city effort to argue 
against a state’s extensive limitations on its ability to tax citizens or incur 
debt—an argument that cities’ property rights were restricted without due pro-
cess of law or amounted to a “taking” of property—would likely fall flat. Tax-
es are one of the few areas in which a clear public/private distinction can be 
drawn: the ability to tax comes directly from the state and can be removed by 
the state, and clearly involves a public, coercive power. And prospectively lim-
iting a local government’s ability to incur debt is simply a limitation on poten-
tial, future property gains. But in some cases, extending corporate rights to 
cities would meaningfully enhance their ability to provide public services, act 
as policy advocates, and create and maintain a distinct ethos or brand. This is 
particularly the case for First Amendment rights. When cities are acting as pol-
icy advocates, or quite clearly promoting the views of some of their residents 
within a larger forum, their actions support many of the purposes of the First 
Amendment, as explored in Part II. 
A. Extending Constitutional Rights to Cities 
When a court considers whether it should extend a particular constitution-
al right to a city, it should ask two questions: (1) whether extension of the right 
would further the purposes of the right, such as promoting public debate or 
enhancing cities’ right to hear speech in the First Amendment context, and (2) 
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whether the right would support the legitimate purposes of the municipality, 
including its more traditional corporate purposes. As also noted above, this test 
tracks and borrows from several existing arguments for corporate rights in the 
business realm.344 
The test largely follows Elizabeth Pollman’s functionalist approach, 
which is to “accord constitutional protections to corporations when it promotes 
the objectives of those protections.”345 One challenge with that test, as Pollman 
observes, is that the purposes of constitutional protections are subject to multi-
ple interpretations, and it is difficult to pinpoint which are the most important 
or legitimate.346 But particularly where a court has listed numerous purposes in 
the business corporate context—as the Supreme Court did in Citizens United v. 
Federal Election Commission, focusing largely on the right of the public to 
hear speech—there is little reason to avoid the extension of this reasoning to 
the municipal corporate context. Indeed, as Part III argued, municipalities 
might often better achieve the objectives of the right than would other corpo-
rate forms.347 
By focusing on whether extending a right to the corporation achieves the 
objectives of the constitutional protection, the functionalist approach also asks 
whether the right, as extended to the corporation, will protect who it was de-
signed to protect—that is, both the municipality itself and its members. This is 
a similar question to the derivative test advocated by Pollman or Margaret 
Blair, which expressly asks how recognizing a corporate right would help the 
corporation’s members or a subset of them—and whether the members joined 
the corporation with the purposes of the right in question in mind.348 Pollman 
notes that the challenge of this sort of approach is identifying whom, exactly, is 
protected by the extension of the right to the corporation, such as shareholders 
or employees.349 Additionally, in some cases corporations are so large that 
granting the corporation a right, such as the freedom of speech, does not mean-
ingfully protect its members. For example, Blair and Pollman observe that 
even if it were possible to identify the views of Coca-Cola’s thousands of 
worldwide “associates” and hundreds of “bottling partners,” among its many 
other members, “it could not be argued that those individuals chose to associ-
ate with each other through Coca-Cola for the purpose of expressing them-
selves politically, or that protecting freedom of speech rights for Coca-Cola 
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would protect the rights of expression of any identifiable group of real people 
behind the corporation.”350 
Similar difficulties would arise with a functionalist test in the municipal 
context—particularly to the extent that functionalism asks about a right’s pur-
pose in terms of its benefits to individuals. Some cities are so large, and so full 
of diverse interests, low- and high-income populations, parents and retirees, 
small and large businesses, industrial entities and environmental groups, that it 
might be difficult to trace the benefits of a municipal corporate right to any 
particular group. In some cases, the group that benefits is clearly identifiable, 
but the extent to which the right cuts against the interests of other municipal 
members is quite clear—and potentially problematic. Qualified immunity for 
local officials benefits these officials, but not the municipality’s residents who 
seek remedies for harms caused by those officials. And rights that would en-
hance the city’s ability to provide public services would benefit some residents 
while potentially harming others. Often, a city provides different charges and 
levels of service to different subsets of residents, such as residential, commer-
cial, and industrial members of the city, and not all of these sectors are consist-
ently pleased with these services. Rights supporting a city’s ability to project 
views onto a larger stage—by, for example, contributing money to oppose or 
support a state referendum—would pose similar conflicts. Although in some 
cases this policy advocacy would beneficially amplify residents’ views, in oth-
er cases it might primarily help mayors or other officials seeking future posi-
tions in state or federal government. 
The fact that a corporation has members with varied interests has not 
stopped courts from granting business corporations constitutional rights, and it 
should not in the case of municipal corporations either, particularly because 
these corporations are arguably more representative of their members, as ex-
plored in Part II. But another concern is that many residents do not join a mu-
nicipal corporation to benefit from a corporate right granted to that corpora-
tion, such as a First Amendment right. For example, many people and busi-
nesses move to a city for reasons of the kind outlined by Charles M. Tiebout, 
such as obtaining goods and services that they need without having to pay tax-
es that they deem too high.351 Whereas certain expressive policies happen to 
come along with this package of policies, it is often not a primary motivator 
for moving. Perhaps even more common than seeking out a package of goods 
and services, many people simply move because they found a job in the city, or 
their family is there. On the other hand, empirical work suggests that many 
people now move to specific cities or neighborhoods in large part to be around 
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people with similar political perspectives, in which case residents would bene-
fit from rights such as those protecting cities’ expressive abilities.352 
Under a functionalist test that asks how granting a right to a city would 
further the purposes of the right—for society, the municipality itself, and the 
municipal members meant to benefit from the right—First Amendment rights 
should likely extend to municipalities in several contexts. Governmental ac-
tions that seem to clearly interfere with the free exchange and consideration of 
information and ideas, such as policies prohibiting localities from considering 
scientific models when regulating in anticipation of sea level rise,353 should 
likely be barred as a violation of municipal First Amendment rights.354 These 
policies substantially interfere with the societally oriented purposes of the First 
Amendment, such as the right of the public to hear diverse views. They also 
impede core municipal functions, including providing public services, such as 
adequate planning and preparation for crises like climate change. And even 
residents that did not join the municipality for expressive reasons would likely 
expect that the municipality would have the freedom to consider various scien-
tific concerns when regulating and to address these concerns. 
A state should also not be able to prohibit a city from communicating 
with residents in particular ways. For example, a state likely could not prevent 
a city that owned and operated its own electricity generation plant from send-
ing a mass mailing explaining why the city supported nuclear or renewable 
power. In Consolidated Edison Co. of New York v. Public Service Commission 
of New York, the U.S. Supreme Court determined that the State of New York 
could not prohibit this type of mailing (in bill form) from a regulated electric 
company—a corporation.355 The Court emphasized that in past cases it had 
“rejected the contention that a State may confine corporate speech to specified 
issues.”356 Any attempts to distinguish this type of corporate right from that of 
a city should likely fail. Here, again, a refusal to grant the right would interfere 
with core purposes of the First Amendment. And more so than with the sea 
level rise example, it would harm municipalities’ members—both officials and 
residents—who expect to be able to have an open exchange of political ideas 
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with their representatives.357 Officials expect to be able to communicate opin-
ions and views to their electorate, and those moving to a municipality assume 
that they will have an opportunity to hear the views of their leaders and com-
municate their support for or opposition to these views. 
In many cases, municipal corporate rights will not be rooted in the First 
Amendment. After all, nearly every local law—from a ban on plastic bags to a 
ban on fracking—could be labeled as “expressive” in that it signals a prefer-
ence—in this case, for environmental protection.358 Drawing a clear line be-
tween municipal activity that is clearly expressive of a municipal interest, as 
opposed to a substantive desire to regulate to achieve a particular goal, would 
be difficult. But there are clear cases of municipalities acting to express the 
views of their leadership and/or member residents, including, for example, 
contributing money to support or oppose a state referendum, or committing to 
a national or international effort to reduce carbon emissions.359 
B. Balancing Local Interests Against Preemption 
One specific setting for recognition of municipal rights is the preemption 
context, in which local rights are pitted against the power of the state to limit 
or wholly remove local authority. As noted in Part I, one of the greatest imped-
iments to municipal rights is states’ tendency to remove those rights in the fis-
cal and political contexts, substantially limiting local governments’ abilities to 
raise money and take certain political stances. States unquestionably have the 
power to preempt local control in all of these areas, and if they do so clearly, 
unequivocally, and expressly, nothing short of a strong constitutional munici-
pal right is likely to overturn the state preemption. But, if municipal corporate 
rights were taken more seriously, they would serve as a factor pushing back 
against states’ wrestling control away from municipalities—particularly where 
the extent of state preemption is not fully clear. 
When courts ask whether a state has preempted a local government in a 
particular area, there are three ways in which preemption can occur, as in the 
federal context. A state may expressly take away local power, or it may im-
pliedly do so by enacting a law that either conflicts with a local law or occu-
pies the regulatory field and leaves no room for local control.360 In all three of 
these areas, courts must engage in a great deal of guesswork to ascertain the 
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true meaning and intent of the legislature—even under express preemption. 
Many express preemptive statutes still allow for some local control in a given 
regulatory area. For example, Texas has preempted most local control over oil 
and gas development but allows local governments to establish “commercially 
reasonable” regulations to address certain aspects of development.361 And 
some express preemption has been interpreted to only remove “technical” au-
thority from local governments—such as their ability to mandate certain types 
of oil and gas equipment at sites—as opposed to broader land use authority.362 
Beyond the interpretational questions that make express preemption less 
clear than it may sound, courts often employ a degree of balancing even in the 
expressive context. For example, when New York’s highest court held that 
New York’s preemption of local “regulation” of oil and gas law did not 
preempt local bans on fracking promulgated under local governments’ land use 
authority, the court noted that it does not “lightly” preempt governments in 
areas where they are exercising traditional home rule authority, thus potentially 
tipping interpretational gray areas in favor of the local government. When a 
preemption question impacted an important aspect of a local government’s 
corporate authority—for example, its provision of public services, particularly 
for individuals who lack many other options, or a government’s expression of 
citizens’ views to a broader audience—courts should similarly consider the 
importance of the municipality’s corporate function, as balanced against the 
state’s legitimate preemption interests. 
Courts must engage in even more interpretive guesswork when determin-
ing whether a local law conflicts with state law, or whether the state has occu-
pied a field, and here, a municipal corporate right might once again tip the bal-
ance in the municipality’s favor, particularly in ambiguous cases. Conflict 
preemption is sometimes defined as a situation in which complying simultane-
ously with local and state law would be impossible, but this is open to a variety 
of interpretations.363 For example, some courts view a requirement that a per-
son pay a tax in one amount to a state, and another amount to a local govern-
ment, as a conflict. Other courts simply acknowledge that the regulated entity 
could pay both taxes.364 And under an alternate definition of conflict preemp-
tion—a situation in which the local law impedes the purpose of state law—this 
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 362 Wallach v. Town of Dryden, 16 N.E.3d 1188, 1203 (N.Y. 2014) (interpreting express preemption 
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of course opens up a variety of potential interpretations. If a state law allows 
for a particular industrial activity and regulates it, but a local government im-
poses even stricter regulations on that same activity, does this impede the 
state’s purpose? 
In Colorado, for example, to address conflict preemption, courts first de-
termine whether the local regulation involves an area of statewide or mixed 
state and local concern, in which case “state law preempts and supersedes” the 
conflicting ordinance.365 For areas of purely local concern, local law prevails. 
Courts use a four-factor test to determine whether, on balance, the area in-
volves local or state matters or a combination of both. This test includes the 
following factors: 
(1) The need for statewide uniformity [of regulation]; 
(2) The extraterritorial impact of the [local regulation]; 
(3) Whether the matter has traditionally been regulated at the state 
or local level; and 
(4) Whether the Colorado Constitution commits the matter to state 
or local regulation.366 
The question of whether the regulation implicates some of the municipali-
ties’ core values as a corporation—for example, its provision of goods and ser-
vices to the public, or its ability to express municipal views on a national 
stage—could either be incorporated into the question of whether local gov-
ernments have traditionally acted in the area of concern (the third factor), or 
added as an independent factor in the balancing test. 
In all three of these gray areas of preemption, recognizing municipal cor-
porate rights and the degree of importance of these rights would simply intro-
duce another consideration into the balancing analysis that courts already em-
ploy. One factor that courts already balance is home rule authority—the ability 
of local governments to control truly local matters, such as choices about pub-
lic services provided or the location of city hall—and traditional areas of regu-
latory authority such as land use decision making. Although the right of local 
self-governance under home rule is limited, some courts have recently used 
home rule to more generally recognize the importance of municipal rights as 
balanced against competing considerations.367 For example, New York’s high-
est court allowed municipalities to ban fracking for oil and gas despite state 
preemptive language that appeared to expressly preempt these bans.368 The 
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 367 See, e.g., Wallach, 16 N.E.3d at 1195 (“[W]e do not lightly presume preemption where the 
preeminent power of a locality to regulate land use is at stake.”). 
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court relied primarily on past cases that had clarified that if the legislature 
wished to preempt local governments’ land use powers in a particular area, it 
had to clearly and expressly do so.369 And because the legislature had not 
preempted these powers in the fracking contexts, local governments could use 
them to ban fracking. But the court also generally noted the importance of 
home rule. It acknowledged that although the legislature can remove local 
home rule powers, the court will not “lightly” preempt a local government that 
is acting within its home rule authority.370 
Thus, in a case preempting a local law, courts should examine the state in-
terest in preemption, such as encouraging economic activity unimpeded by 
conflicting regulation, avoiding “races to the bottom,” and ensuring that the 
scale of governance matches the scale of the externalities. Courts should also 
focus on the municipal rights at stake and their importance to the municipali-
ty’s legitimate corporate functions—adding this as a factor, in addition to home 
rule, that is balanced against the state’s interests, particularly when a state 
preemption statute is ambiguous with respect to the scope of preemption. 
The state will still often prevail under a test that balances a state’s legiti-
mate interests in preemption against the local government’s home rule and 
corporate interests. For example, in policy areas like hydraulic fracturing, in 
which externalities cross local lines, conflicting local regulations could poten-
tially impede oil and gas development. Operators moving from town to town 
would have to identify and comply with different requirements, and municipal-
ities might compete to attract industry with loose regulation or “race to the 
top” tactics, issuing ever more stringent regulations to attract residents who 
oppose oil and gas drilling in their backyard. 
But this is also an area involving strong local home rule authority that 
implicates core municipal corporate interests. The regulation of industrial land 
uses falls squarely within local governments’ home rule powers—although in 
states that define home rule relatively narrowly, the regulation of any industry 
that operates beyond the confines of the municipality is considered a matter of 
statewide concern, or mixed state and local concern. Further, the regulation of 
oil and gas development centrally affects a local government’s ability to pro-
vide effective public services. Cities and towns in places like North Dakota, 
where oil development has boomed, amassed millions of dollars in debt to 
provide the infrastructure necessary to support the people who rushed into 
town as part of the boom.371 Take the example of Watford City, North Dakota, 
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which had no debt prior to the boom. After oil and gas companies rushed into 
the city to drill and hydraulically fracture wells, the city had “roughly $12.5 
million in outstanding loans” to fund the expansion of water and sewer infra-
structure and other city services.372 
One difficulty in balancing municipalities’ corporate and home rule rights 
on the one hand, and state rights on the other, is that states possess many of the 
same corporate values as municipalities. States, like municipalities and busi-
ness corporations, provide goods and services, represent their members, and 
project their members’ views onto a larger stage. California, in aggressively 
pushing for more stringent environmental regulations—such as limits on car-
bon emissions from automobiles—might better and more forcefully represent 
its many staunchly environmental residents than any one California municipal-
ity.373 But the “decentralized” justification for corporate rights noted in Part 
II—which argues that either traditional business corporations or municipal 
corporations better represent and respond to their members’ concerns simply 
by avoiding larger, centralized bureaucracies, would argue that the smaller 
unit—the municipality—has the upper hand.374 Indeed, as noted above, munic-
ipalities are technically far more representative of their members on a per capi-
ta basis than are states, although voter participation in municipal elections is 
notoriously low.375 And local governments, both as speakers on behalf of their 
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citizens and speakers in their own right, provide a far more diverse array of 
views than states and serve as an important counterforce to increasingly 
aligned and uniform state and federal views.376 
This Article does not endeavor to provide a bulletproof judicial test for 
extending corporate rights to municipalities or shielding municipalities from 
preemption. Considering, however, the corporate values of municipalities 
sheds light on an essential, but often ignored, function of local governments—
particularly with the often-singular focus on home rule powers—and suggests 
that municipalities should be able to reasonably argue that rights extended to 
business corporations are equally relevant in the municipal context. 
CONCLUSION 
Corporations of all types have an increasingly important role, both for so-
ciety and their members. In the midst of federal gridlock and a seemingly end-
less pattern of bipartisan bickering and shifts in party control, corporations 
make a relatively constant contribution to civic life. Corporations influence the 
law by refusing to build new headquarters or host major events in states that 
have enacted highly controversial laws. They influence the behavior of other 
individuals and businesses by, for example, refusing to loan to entities that take 
stands antithetical to the corporations’ purpose. And corporations and states, 
combined, might ultimately achieve the U.S. international climate commit-
ments from which the federal government recently withdrew. 
But municipalities are an often-forgotten corporate player. As hosts to the 
bulk of U.S. economic activity, as loud voices within state and national policy 
circles and courts, and as providers of essential human services, municipali-
ties—and their function, in particular—cannot be understated. Many aspects of 
the law already allow municipalities to function as they need to. They may 
own and operate businesses, sue and be sued, and, through proprietary actions, 
substantially influence national markets by, for example, purchasing “green” 
fleets of buses and city maintenance trucks. But preemption, in particular, and 
courts’ insistence on separating municipal corporate rights from other rights, 
impedes many essential municipal functions. This Article argues that the mere 
recognition of municipal corporations as true corporations, not separate from 
the many other forms of corporations that exist, could help municipalities gain 
these needed rights. Recognizing the functional importance of the municipality 
as a corporation—its need to represent the views of its individual members, 
amplify their voices, respond to member concerns by promulgating certain 
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laws, and provide services demanded from its residents—could attach im-
portant constitutional rights to municipalities and weigh against state preemp-
tion of certain municipal actions. 
  
 
